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Acquired - Adapting Episode 2- Sequoia’s Black Swan Memo (with Roelof Botha)

Published Mar 30, 2020 · Duration 42:30 · Language en · 5 highlights

Summary

本期《Adapting by Acquired》邀请了红杉资本(Sequoia Capital)资深合伙人Roelof Botha,讲述红杉在2020年3月5日发布的著名“黑天鹅”备忘录背后的故事。Botha解释说,红杉凭借全球化的视角率先看到了中国封城的严峻情况,并意识到疫情在美国的传播被严重低估,因此感到有责任提前向被投公司发出警告。他借用达尔文的进化论指出,能够生存下来的不是最强或最聪明的,而是最能适应变化的,并强调在下行周期中现金和跑道(runway)是企业最重要的关注点。结合自己在PayPal担任CFO、经历互联网泡沫破裂的经验,他讲述了如何逐行审查开支、快速建立可行的商业模式,并指出约束往往能激发创造性的解决方案。他还谈到红杉如何为创始人搭建社区、准备裁员最佳实践,并对投资组合公司进行逐一的健康度分析。在投资节奏上,他用一级方程式赛车入弯前全力刹车、出弯时全力加速的比喻,表示希望在危机后加速布局。最后他分享了Square上市时定价过低、但红杉凭借耐心持有四年、在股价涨到80美元时才分配股份,从而为LP带来更好回报的故事,强调聚焦长期主义。

Highlights

  1. Nobody ever regrets making fast and decisive adjustments to changing circumstances. In downturns, revenue and cash levels always fall faster than expenses. In some ways business mirrors biology. As Darwin surmised, those who survive are not the strongest or the most intelligent, ...

    没有人会后悔对变化的环境做出快速而果断的调整。在下行期,收入和现金水平总是比支出下降得更快。在某种意义上,商业就像生物学。正如达尔文所推断的,能够生存下来的不是最强壮或最聪明的,而是最能适应变化的。

    The core thesis of the Black Swan memo, framing business survival through Darwinian adaptability.
  2. There's the parable of the wheat or the rice on the chessboard. Two to the power n becomes a very large number as n grows. And things that grow exponentially, we just don't understand it. Something that looked trivial 12 days ago, but it's doubling every six days, suddenly looks ...

    有一个棋盘上放麦子或大米的寓言。随着n增大,2的n次方会变成一个非常大的数字。对于指数增长的事物,我们就是理解不了。12天前看起来微不足道的东西,如果每六天翻一番,仅仅两周后就会变得截然不同。

    A vivid explanation of why people underestimate exponential viral spread.
  3. Forest fires have been a part of the landscape in the US for a long time, and it will often clear the brush. And the great trees that survive end up thriving disproportionately once the fire has cleared, because there's more sunlight and there's more space for those that survive. ...

    森林火灾长期以来一直是美国地貌的一部分,它往往会清除灌木丛。而幸存下来的参天大树在火灾过后会异常繁茂地生长,因为幸存者能获得更多的阳光和空间。所以你必须耐心等待时机,确保能凭借真正差异化的产品出击。

    A striking metaphor for how crises clear competition and reward strong survivors.
  4. I went to a driving course once on a Formula One racing track. And the thing that they taught me is you brake as hard as you can while the car is going straight before you get to the corner. And then you have to figure out how to accelerate at the right point at the apex out of t ...

    我曾在一级方程式赛道上参加过一次驾驶课程。他们教我的是,在进弯之前、车还在直线行驶时要尽全力刹车。然后你要弄清楚在出弯的顶点、恰当的时机全力加速,这样才能冲刺领先。这正是我们想要应用到我们的公司和我们自身的类比。如果说有什么的话,我想在这场危机中加速冲出去。

    A memorable racing analogy for timing defense and offense in investing.
  5. We didn't distribute a single Square share until four years after the IPO. Four years. The fact that it was a nine-dollar-a-share IPO didn't matter because we distributed shares when it got to eighty. And so at the end of the day, we made a much better return for our limited part ...

    在Square上市后的四年里,我们一股都没有分配。整整四年。上市时每股九美元这件事根本不重要,因为我们是在股价涨到八十美元时才分配股份的。所以归根结底,我们靠耐心为有限合伙人带来了好得多的回报。

    A concrete payoff story showing the power of patience over a disappointing IPO.
Full transcript

It was pretty good. It was... Yes, it was pretty good. Don't doubt your vibe. For not being his full-time gig, it was pretty good. Emoji Records. Welcome to Episode 2 of Adapting by Acquired. They know you got it. Yeah, well, I rehearsed. Or for those keeping track at home, Season 6, Episode 5.

We are continuing our series to bring you the stories of great companies and great leaders who are adapting to a world that's changing in real time. Today we are covering the story behind the memo read around the world, Sequoia Capital's Black Swan memo, amazingly published only 20 days ago as we record this. Man, feels like 20 lifetimes ago. I know.

I know. Well, we are joined by the best person in the world to tell us about it, longtime Sequoia partner, Rulof Bohta. Today's episode is different than last week's episode with Canless. We are going much closer to acquired's bread and butter of technology and venture capital. This conversation is particularly interesting, not just to hear the story behind the Black Swan memo, but also to get a real-time look at how Sequoia themselves are thinking about adapting during this time, along with their portfolio companies. Before we jump in, If you haven't already, we want to strongly encourage you to join the acquired Slack community. I honestly think at this point, it's probably the best community on the internet for people focused on building and investing in great companies. We really mean that, and that's a testament to you all and the quality of people that listen to this show. It's been pretty awesome, especially over the last...

week or so just seeing how we're all supporting each other in there and helping everybody get through this time. So you can find a link on our website to get an invite. You should definitely sign up. The other thing we want to tell you about is as we announced on the last episode, we're adding something big to the limited partner program that we're really excited about. We're going to be hosting monthly calls on Zoom for all LPs, which we're calling appropriately enough.

LP calls. So when you sign up for the limited partner program you get both all our LP episodes which go deeper on nitty gritty company building topics and access to the monthly LP calls with both of us. You can sign up by clicking the link in the show notes or going to glow.fm slash acquired. All right listeners.

Now is a great time to talk about a new partner of ours here on Acquired. Lagora, the agentic operating system that is redefining how the world's best legal teams work. Yup, it's sort of obvious that AI is going to completely change the legal industry. I bet most of you listening have dropped a contract into some sort of AI chatbot out there. Lagora took that insight and asked the question, what if you really built something with that power from the ground up for the legal industry?

So the founders did exactly what great founders do. Operate with obsessive customer focus. They embedded inside a massive law firm for months. They sat with the lawyers just watching how the work really gets done. And that's how you get features that customers love like tabular review where you.

drop in a folder of hundreds of contracts and it pulls every key term into a grid a lawyer can actually work with. Lagores Bed here is interesting. Since it lets each lawyer handle more complexity, any given person can increase the quality of their work and do higher value work, and this means that the pie can grow even as each individual task takes less time.

And they recently launched LaGora agent offering greater intelligence and performance. The agent lets lawyers set an objective. Then it can handle the planning and the execution and delivery of the final product. Legal teams get to maintain full control and transparency since they're still involved where judgment is required. And LaGora works where you already work. You can use it within Microsoft Word while redlining or drafting. The early LaGora numbers essentially speak for themselves when they have a head-to-head pilot with their top competitor they win 70% of the time LaGora now has over a hundred thousand lawyers on the platform from 1200 legal teams in 50 countries and crazily they went from one million to a hundred million in ARR in about 18 months truly insane numbers and that is the real test

Plenty of things demo well, but the question is whether a busy associate actually reaches for it during crunch time or whether a partner trusts it before going into a conversation with a major client. If your legal team wants to check it out, whether you're a law firm or you're in house at a company, you can learn more at logora.com slash acquired and just tell them that Ben and David sent you. And with that, David, we will dive into our interview with Rulof. We are.

Super lucky to have Rule Off with us today. Rule Off has been a partner at Sequoia since 2003 and led early investments in some of the most important companies that we've covered on this show. Companies like Instagram, YouTube, and Square.

He currently leads the firm's US business as one of Sequoia's three stewards, along with Doug Leone and Neil Shen. And prior to joining Sequoia, Rulof was the CFO of PayPal, which is particularly relevant to our conversation today. Having helped navigate them through the .com crash, their subsequent IPO, and ultimately their sale to eBay for one and a half billion dollars. Welcome Rulof, and thanks for joining us in these interesting times.

Thank you. I wish the circumstances were different, but I'm glad to be here. Us too. We're glad to have you. Let's jump right into it. On March 5th, you guys did something that now seems obvious in hindsight, but definitely did not seem obvious on March 5th was, which was... Yeah, I think March 5th, that was like two years ago at this point. It feels like there's that learning core rate of that people have been saying about some decades. Nothing happens in some weeks, decades happen.

It's been about two decades. You guys released publicly both simultaneously emailed all your portfolio CEOs and posted on Medium what you call the Black Swan memo. I'm sure most of our listeners have read it probably multiple times at this point. You know, I just want to point out I want to highlight one kind of quote from it that again probably everyone's read but it's such a stark difference between what you guys said and what so many other investors and people were saying at the moment, you say having weathered every business downturn for nearly 50 years, we've learned an important lesson. Nobody ever regrets making fast and decisive adjustments to changing circumstances in downturn's revenue and cash levels always fall faster than expenses in some ways business mirrors biology as Darwin surmised those who survive are not the strongest or the most intelligent but the most adaptable to change. Can you walk us through?

As you were writing this and getting ready to hit publish, like, what were you feeling internally? The sense of nervousness that the world wasn't really paying attention to the reality that we were facing. We have the benefit of being a global partnership. So we were seeing what was happening in China with our business and with our partners and what it was like to be under lockdown. We've been through many business cycles. It's a way of, you know, we're in around 48 years. We've been through so many of these cycles and we've seen this movie before. And our sense was that People hadn't quite realized what was about to happen. It was like watching an accident happen in slow motion. You could just see it. And we felt a duty and obligation to do something about it. Well, let's set the stage for folks. This was six days before the NBA announcement came out. So it was sort of a week before the general American consciousness woke up and said, Oh my God, this is a huge deal. Did you worry at all that you were

Jumping the gun and as a related question, I mean, Sequoia is such a force in our ecosystem. Did you think about the risk of gosh, do we, do we incite something by by releasing something like this? We do, which is why we do this very infrequently. The last time we did something comparable was at the end of 2008 with the wrist in peace, good times, memo which.

wasn't intended to be published it was really intended just for our founders because we wanted them to understand what was happening and it comes at a risk I mean even they I heard from people back in 2008 that you know we were the reason the crash happened like as if we had that kind of power yeah I heard people complain you know we're being alarmist and things like that but we really felt a duty that you know maybe people are gonna be uncomfortable with us saying these sort of things, but we have an obligation to tell people what we see coming around the corner. Someone challenged me and said, well, what if it doesn't turn out to be that bad? And I said, if that's the case, I'd be so thankful. I'd be so thankful. And I will eat apple pie for having published this. There's so much more important for us to put the word of warning out. Often when you're in the trenches as a company, you have a slightly different perspective on things, especially if you haven't been through previous cycles. And I remember when I was there at PayPal in

You know, I joined in March of 2000. The NASDAQ saw it. It's slide in April. And I remember being at a board meeting with Mike Meritz from Sequoia in June. And he told us he wanted us focus on runway. Because the financing environment has changed forever. And I think honestly, for all of us is, you know, first timers, if you will, in the company, we didn't quite fathom that. We thought that, you know, what did we experience for the last two years would continue. And he really rung the bell. And we paid attention.

I mean, that month, we really started to sharpen up pencils to make sure that we had enough runway to make it to the other side. I'm super curious. You've talked about this a bunch. And obviously a CFO, you were right there at the Elm doing this. What were the things you did? I mean, you were, I believe, the first technology company to go public after the crash, then had this wonderful exit. Like, what were the actual things that you did to...

to save the company and to stay on a growth trajectory even through all this carnage. Firstly, it's obviously a team effort. I mean, I was one of many people of the company that rallied together. And I think that's one of the things that you see in this unfortunate humanitarian crisis. I mean, I think the thing that's different about this, by the way, is it's a health crisis in addition to an economic crisis at a global scale. I mean, that makes it so different from any of these other incidents we've seen.

awful many levels, but I do think it's very different from what we had back then. But we rallied as a team, and we looked through the P&L. I remember literally going through line by line on every single thing on which we were spending money to figure out what was truly essential to helping us build a successful business. On the expense side, the things that you can control, we tried feverishly to raise more money to extend our runway, and we got religion about a business model.

I mean, up until I think June 10 or June 22,000, PayPal didn't charge for its service. And at that point, we realized if we wanted to keep going, we had to figure out a business model and make it a great business model. And that's exactly the kind of focus that we got because this external environment changed so dramatically. Constraints enable you to come up with creative new solutions. And so I think you're going to find an incredible array of entrepreneurs coming up with wonderful solutions in the midst of this terrible crisis. All right, listeners. Now is a great time to tell you about a longtime friend of the show, Vanta. AI has scrambled the whole security picture. It used to be that you proved that you were secure once a year, an audit or a static PDF, then everyone would not, and you're done. But in an AI first world, that doesn't hold up anymore. Yep. Your risk surface changes every week now.

A vendor turns on an AI feature or someone writes in a new model without telling IT, and your posture is different than it was last week, let alone at your last audit. Vanta's own research found that around 70% of companies have this, quote unquote, shadow AI running with no security review at all. Right. And that's where Vanta comes in. They're the leading agentic trust platform, meaning they've built the thing that closes the gap. And the way that they close that gap is Vanta agent.

Think of it as a GRC engineer, that's governance, risk, and compliance, except that it's software and it doesn't sleep. It finds the issues, drafts the fixes, and cuts the time that you'd spend on vendor assessments in half. In half, which is exactly why more than 16,000 companies today run on Vanta. Companies like Ramp, Curcer, and Snowflake all stay audit-ready and catch the risks that crop up between audits across every vendor.

every AI tool, the whole environment. And that's the real value. Trust has to be continuous now, which is why Vanta automates your security, your compliance, and the work to earn and prove trust. We're huge fans of Vanta over here. And literally hundreds of acquired listeners have become Vanta customers at their companies over the years. So you can get $1,000 off Vanta at Vanta.com slash acquired. That's V-A-N-T-A dot com slash acquired for $1,000 off and just tell them that Ben and David sent you.

to go back for a sec to the black swan memo. Can you talk a little bit about what it was over the preceding weeks before March 5th that you were seeing in China and obviously through your unique perspective that kind of gave you confidence that hey, this is a lot more serious than people are realizing in the US and elsewhere. I think we saw how team in China immediately had to go into a full lockdown. Just sort of a dramatic change at a national level was over a billion people and just not just in the province that was affected but everywhere that they were taking it seriously. So clearly the people at the front lines had seen that this was a virus unlike others that were spreading a lot faster and had higher mortality rate than a typical seasonal flu. So that just felt very, very different. And I think it was pretty obvious that by then there were cases showing up in the US even though there was a travel ban at one point.

It was just too porous. People could have come here from England, China, they could have gone to other parts of the world and coming into the US. And so, it was quite likely that there's a bigger problem today in the US than we realize. And this is the unfortunate thing about the absence of testing infrastructure right now in the country. Now, I have a friend in New York who had it for 11 days before he was confirmed positive last week. My brother in San Francisco, I think, has it, but he...

He literally can't get tested because he's not in a high risk group. So I think we just had a sense that the problem was actually a lot bigger. You know, there's the parable of the wheat or the rice in the chessboard. You know, with the person wants to get compensated, one, two, four, etc. And that's obviously a great thing for people who study computer science. But you know, to the power in becomes a very large number as n grows. And things that grow exponentially, we just don't understand it. Something that looked trivial.

12 days ago but it's doubling every six days suddenly looks dramatically different just two weeks later and so I think we we saw that this was at the cusp of happening in America and so we we felt this obligation I guess it earlier to make sure that people paid attention and acted now. It's a great lead in to something that David and I talk about a lot and David I don't think I have shared this with you but I look up.

to you a lot in the way that you think about playing defense and playing offense and being very careful about when is a time for defense and when is a time for offense. Doing both at the same time, you should have to be careful what actions are for which thing. And rule off, I want to dive in on defense right now.

You guys have been putting out a reasonable amount of content compared to Sequoia of old, and one of the pieces that you publish for entrepreneurs is this decision matrix. And I would sort of think about this as defense. How should entrepreneurs use that? And then I'm curious to ask you some questions about offense. So I want to give credit to one of our CFOs in the portfolio. He doesn't want to be singled out to name, but he developed this for a portfolio company where I happen to be on the board for Sequoia.

And I thought it was an incredible structure. In that case, the company had sort of seven main scenarios with a couple of sub scenarios. And I just thought it's a wonderful framework to address the challenge you face, because we don't know the state of the world. Or there's so much uncertainty right now, but I'll be actually going to reopen in three weeks, four weeks, ten weeks. Is it going to be a second wave? Are there going to be five waves? Is the world going to be in a week? We don't know. So I thought it was a wonderful way to think about what are the various scenarios that may play out?

what are the strategies you could pursue and what does it do for your resulting cash balance at some future date that is important and your end is as good as any I guess at this point because companies need to survive. Cash is the most important thing companies have to focus on right now because if you don't survive obviously there's no chance for you to build an enduring business and so that's the reason I thought there was a fabulous framework and again we felt we wanted to share it with as many people as possible and we did actually on Friday we had a a Q&A session with over 100 portfolio companies several of our partners hosted this call and we shared it with those companies and we just felt then that we wanted to share it with everybody now to ask the question on offense this time is incredibly challenging for a lot of people and we should in no way gloss over that i'm sure it's challenging for you it's challenging for me yet you can sort of squint and find ways to

actually turn it into something positive and find perhaps a dislocation in a market or an opportunity that's emerged that was never a need from people before. And I just love to get your perspective on how can people be proactive and turn this into a positive? Well, there are a couple of companies obviously that benefit from us all having to work from home and things like that.

the product we're using zoom is obviously benefiting the companies like loom in our portfolio that are benefiting the delivery companies or an essential service in my mind to make sure that we get food and get delivery of basic necessities. There's a class of companies that are benefiting you may not be one of those companies so that doesn't really help you. The thing that I think really everybody can focus on in this time is product development. Keep on investing in your product. Sales and marketing by definition are going to be challenged over the next few months.

because people are going to shift their consumption behavior face-to-face selling if you're an enterprise company is going to be hampered. Marketing channels maybe are flooded by the things and it may seem insensitive candidly for you to pedal certain types of products right now, it's just not the right time. Hunker down and focus on product development. Build that truly differentiated product that if you can survive, gives you a huge advantage when you come out the other side. Because part of what happens here, I'll use the analogy of our namesake Sequoia Tree.

like forest fires have been a part of the landscape in the US for a long time and it will often clear the brush and the equate trees that survive end up thriving disproportionately once the fire has cleared right because there's more sunlight and there's more space for those that survive and so you've got to wait your time out and make sure that you can pounce with a truly differentiated product because the competitive landscape is probably going to be clear for you after that.

I think the other thing to do just before that is to look for a community. So, you know, it's a lot of what we've been doing, trying to get our founders together, not only with the sort of weekly call that we're doing now, but getting founder to founder communities together. There's so much ingenuity and so much good advice and tips that they can share with each other and also just kind of spurts where they can share some of the suffering candidly that's happening right now. So, lean into community, lean into your product.

I know you guys have done some innovative things creating spaces right now for portfolio companies. How are you doing that and how are you interacting with them and them with each other? Well I think at an individual level obviously board members are in frequent contact with the companies as we try to share base practices. In addition to the matrix which we shared publicly there are a couple of other things that we've prepared for companies.

for the unfortunate company that may need to go through a reduction in force, for example, we've actually prepared some best practices that we've seen, so we can share people and just help arm them for some of the challenges that lie ahead. We've created the Q&A with us as a group, so we get over 100 companies to get together with Sequoia partners and we have a few prepared remarks, things that we're seeing and we open it up for questions. We're arranging founder to founder sessions, No Sequoia person present where they can just industries that are relevant where they can share best practices. We're also doing that for CFOs because I think a lot of the CFOs across the portfolio are dealing with similar challenges. What do they do about potential rent abatement? What are they doing to renegotiate debt? What happened to that financing that was supposed to close, things like that, where they can also get together and help each other? If anything, this was also accelerated our desire to build even more.

digital products around our community. We've provided ourselves in the sort of community things we do with activities like base camp and AMP and other programs we have. Obviously, those are halted right now. And what can we do to recreate as much of that as possible online as something we're working on? Can we circle back real quick before we get off of playing offense for folio companies? I want to come back to your time at PayPal. It struck me that like, I didn't realize that PayPal didn't have a business model or at least a viable business model until after the crash. As I kind of think about like the hierarchy of impacts of change, you can have as a startup, you know, there's sort of like at the bottom is like sales and marketing and then nothing at sales and marketing. And then at the mid level is product, but actually the highest level I always think is changing a business model. Now is kind of a really good opportunity to do that. How did you guys think about

You know, there was the necessity of, okay, you need to make revenue now. But how did you figure out that business model so quickly during that time at PayPal? Necessity is the mother of invention. I don't think it was that difficult to figure out that as a payments company, there were so many precedents of charging transaction-based fees. I think there were some other nuances where we figured out how to get bank account funding so that we had a much high gross margin than traditional credit card processors did.

So there's some other things we did. We also had to figure out solutions to online fraud, which took down many of our competitors and was a very expensive thing for us as well. We lost millions of dollars in 2000 to scalable online fraud. Part of what we talked about at the company was at the end of the day, if we can't keep the company alive, because people are willing to pay for the service we provide, we don't really have a reason to exist. But we need to deliver enough value so that whatever we charge leaves enough of a gap of Value capture to the customer with their happy to pay for the service we have and I think many companies may face that type of a crucible moment over the next six months if they've been free services or if the boson business model hasn't really been refined properly But it's clarifying at some little yeah, where you're really forced to show up in a way that says Hey, I am delivering enough value here to charge for it. What's the quote about is it a Warren Buffett quote?

You know who has their shorts on when the tide goes out. Man, we're trading out. I think it might be hard. Exactly. Is it? Okay. Well, I'll give you another one that we used actually this week in a partnership, which is, um, com sees never made a good sailor. Yeah. And we've had a long period of com sees. We have. And this is going to be a time where I think you're really going to see people, the friendship, themselves and how they deal with the crisis.

who steps up, who provides leadership, who reminds a company of the mission of the company, the purpose that they have beyond just delivering a product. Those are the sort of companies that I think can really excel in a time of crisis. All right, listeners. Now is a great time to thank our longtime friend of the show, ServiceNow. If you are running a large enterprise, AI agents are likely spread across every team and deploying them is no longer the hard part.

Yeah, the hard part is knowing what permissions they have, what employees are using them for, or what decisions AI is making. AI security for an enterprise at scale is not a small concern. Like the risks are real. Exactly. And the challenge with AI is governing it, securing it, measuring it, and making sure that it actually delivers value. That is why ServiceNow built the AI control tower.

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because they've spent more than 20 years building the operational backbone of the enterprise. The workflows, governance, approval, security controls, and institutional knowledge that power how work actually gets done across IT, HR, customer service, finance, and security. Service now already runs more than 100.

billion workflows annually, and trillions of transactions for more than 85% of the Fortune 500. So when companies need a place to govern AI at enterprise scale, they're building on a platform at the center of how their business already operates. And in a future that isn't going to be one AI, it's going to be thousands of AI agents working across every function of the company. But the question is, who's managing them all?

So if you're trying to turn AI ambition into real business outcomes and make it work safely, securely at scale, go check out servicenow.com slash acquired and tell them that Ben and David sent you. Well, I want to move us along to a section here that we're doing an adapting called adapting and really talk about Sequoia itself and how you're adapting. And I remember when we interviewed Doug, he spoke of the war room days of managing the 1999 fund after the dot com crash.

What does the Sequoia War Room of March 2020 look like, especially as you literally can't be in a war room? No, the virtual war room. The other thing which are challenging is we have our biannil LP meeting next week. Just for context, it was originally supposed to be in India. And then in January, we started to worry, given what we were seeing in China. So we actually moved it in January from India to California, because we thought that we were going to be issues.

in this early April late March timeframe. I mean, just concretely we took action. And then obviously, having it in California started to not look feasible, so we've moved it to a virtual LP meeting. So in the midst of preparing for a very important event for us, I mean, our LP is our customers and we want to do, we want to have a great show for them in some sense and provide candid feedback and reporting on our funds. At the same time, we're running around like crazy looking after our portfolio companies.

The most important thing we focused on over the last two weeks is our companies. Sequoia, as a business, we've been around almost five decades. We're not in a task part, fortunately. But some of our companies really do face challenges. And so we've really oriented everything towards what is based for our companies. We've built a bunch of online tools, so we have resources where we can all look at things. We have daily stand-ups using Zoom so that everybody can stay in touch, we understand what the prioritization is.

We're using many more that's among the partnership within the partnership here so that as a team since we you know What do you do to make the effect of being on the office together so that we just stay in touch a little bit more frequently And we've created these online resources and part of the most important thing we've done is to do a very thorough analysis of the portfolio health So literally company by company across every single company in the US we've gone down to figure out okay at your end in December What was the expected runway based on cash and burn then what do we think it is now given the change to circumstances and which of the two three dozen companies We really need to spend most of our attention some companies are early stage six people product development I mean in some sense they're unaffected They're just building the product and hope to launch next year and then there are other companies that are really affected significantly And so as a team we try to figure out how do we rally around them?

and how do we bring resources to be to help them navigate through this tricky period? As you sort of frame that up around the portfolio companies, you know, it sounds obvious that, of course, you would spend time with your portfolio companies, what are the things that you're not doing as much of that you would normally be spending your days doing and how has sort of this time forced you to change that? Seems like we're doing more of everything. Honestly.

No, less of that, too. I mean, interviews are still going on. We're just doing them all as virtual interviews. I do think they're probably one or two higher somewhere where you're going to wait to meet the person in person before you make a formal final hiring decision. But for us, we're onboarding people remotely. We did this on Monday. We had a person who joined who, you know, first virtual onboarding for us as our portfolio companies are doing. I was on a call earlier today with a company and they're onboarded 21 people on Monday remotely.

And people are going to keep hiring, they're going to keep building products. So I think a lot of those things stay the same. We continue to make investments. We formally approved two new series A investments last week. And those meetings were virtual meetings. So business continues. Has something changed in what you look for in companies compared to a call it two, three months ago? In some sense, not, I mean, certainly not at the series A stage because I think the, you know, those companies.

There are such an early stage that product needs to be so differentiated and really solve a problem that would transcend the current market. Obviously, if the US is shut down indefinitely, that's a different situation. But these companies all have a sound value proposition and once things are a little bit more normal. Even if the economy goes through a recession, we believe in these businesses because they're really solving really important problems. And so we have confidence in them. We have asked people how they plan to respond to a changing circumstance, a little bit of a test.

On whether they're nimble, are they flexible, or they just turned it to the reality of the world we're in right now, so that clearly is a question we're asking that's different. And then we're also spending time thinking about what new categories may be unfairly favored, sort of post coronacopelops. Do you end up with digital health companies, online education? A bunch of things may change, and are we forced into a behavior change through this environment we're in now that sticks?

I think it's a really interesting question. A lot of people are thinking about this. I think it's a really interesting thing to try to conjecture. That's the perfect transition to kind of the topic we wanted to wrap up with you on. I was thinking about it when you mentioned your LP meeting next week, which man, I feel for you. I know how important those are having...

done them, attended them and everything. It was interesting. Just yesterday, I attended one virtually, and it was amazing that it was actually better. These tend to be pretty dry affairs. This is a small example, but either through the LP meeting or more broadly, have you guys started to think about what kind of permanent changes to Sequoia might come out of this? I think we're going to be, we'd already seen a trend where companies are becoming more distributed.

Partly because of the cost of living in the Bay Area is so high and the cost of hiring engineers is just so high. We've already seen a trend where companies are willing to tolerate remote work by individuals or multiple remote development offices. I think that trend is going to gather steam. I think you're going to run this experiment that's actually measurable on how people perform in this kind of an environment. So I think that just objectively is going to change the debate.

Because I think it's so easy. As humans, we resist behavior change whenever we can. And this is forcing behavior change. So I think tolerating businesses that are distributed, learning how to work effectively with distributed teams. I think we're likely to see people start companies in many more places. And again, that's a trend that it already started. Silicon Valley doesn't have a monopoly on idea generation. And I think many more people will start companies elsewhere. So we probably need to be more willing to fly or if not fly given health issues to online assessments of companies. So I think those appear to have been changed. You know, you all are organized or at least have been to this point geographically for a company. And I think there's going to be a lot more of these like Zapier, right? Like we've had Wade on the show. They have no office. How are you going to think about a company like that in the future? Is that a US investment? Is that a global investment?

Well, you know, honestly, so we've run into a couple of conflicts like this, but I don't actually think of them as conflicts. Our team in India is an investor in a fabulous company called FreshWorks. Most of FreshWorks customers are on the developed world, including the U.S. So, you know, my guess is the majority of the revenue comes from the U.S., but there is an investment out of our India office because that's where the company is based. And they have a presence in the U.S. too, but we help them. We're one partnership globally.

We've done some really clever things behind the scenes to make sure that we feel like a single partnership and how we share knowledge and share compensation and things like that in a way that makes it feel good. And I'd rather have more of those. I mean, that's a great problem to have honestly.

There's a lot of folks talking about the sheer amount of dry powder that has been committed to venture firms in this climate. So they're saying, you know, the funding won't slow down because, oh my gosh, there's just billions and billions and billions. It's been promised to venture firms. So therefore, deployment should continue at the exact same pace.

How do you think about that? And it's probably too early to tell, but have you thought about should we slow deployment? Should we change when we want to raise certain funds? Should we change the mix of initial capital deployment versus follow-ons? Does a climate affect something like that for you guys? So the two questions there, I think the one is what is the LP behavior and the other one is what's our behavior. And so the interesting thing in 2008, maybe, not because we had a crystal ball just because we felt things were a little frothy.

Our investment pays have actually slowed down on the first off of 2008 before Lehman happened. And then we accelerated in 2009. So I don't know if you've ever done a driving course, but I went to one once on a Formula One racing track. And the thing that they taught me is you break as hard as you can while the car is going straight before you get to the corner.

And then you have to figure out how to accelerate at the right point that the apex out of the corner so that you can sprint ahead. And this is exactly the analogy that we want to apply for our companies and for ourselves. We slowed down in 2019, not because we had some crystal ball again that this was going to happen, but we just, things didn't quite feel right. If anything, I want to accelerate out of this. I think there could be fabulous investment opportunities and great companies to be built. So that's what we plan to do. For our piece, Our clients are almost exclusively these Endowment's foundations and nonprofits, and we're really proud of the great causes represented by our LPs. We actually got an email earlier this week that about 10 of our LPs, people like the Cleveland Clinic, Johns Hopkins University, the Welcome Trust, Stanford, MIT, or all working on either better diagnostics.

potential treatments or vaccines for coronavirus so we love the fact that our clients are doing these things so when we generate profits it helps them do these sort of things. I think our clients are relatively well protected but if you talk about the industry at large I suspect some LPs are going to end up with cash flow issues just like there are many other businesses that are going to end up with cash flow issues and that may at the margin you know lower the amount of intercapital being deployed over the next year or two but that's total speculation I don't know.

Well, LPs had already had already gone up so much for LPs, just with the bull run evaluations on the private markets and lack of liquidity over the last 10 years. Now with public markets dropping so much, you can get into a situation as an LP where you aim to have, say, 15% of your assets in private markets total.

And now you have 40% of your assets in private markets, and that can be a scary position. Well, is that, and then LPs may also end up with cash flow issues on their own, right? It's a part of what we saw in 2008, 2009 or some LPs have ongoing commitments, that's outflow commitments. If you're an endowment at a university, you probably represent more than half the expenditure of the university. And it may be that donations dry up, right? So philanthropy shrinks in an environment like this. And so they're even more dependent on the endowments being able to continue to pay for teachers and, you know, keeping the school hospital going and things like that. So, so the bunch of cash flow issues that may also then drive people to pull back from venture capital. But, you know,

It's so neat to tell. I mean, you know, I look at the generations every day in the stock market. And it's like flipper coin. Is it plus 10 minus 10 today? Like, I don't know. And so it's all hard to figure out, you know, where things last. As we're recording this, it's only been 20 days since you wrote the memo. And it got it feels like 20 years. All right, listeners. Now is a great time to talk about one of our favorite companies, Statsig.

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The real advantage is how quickly you learn what changes actually created value for customers, and how fast you can use that signal to guide what you shipped next. This is where Statsig comes in. It brings experimentation, feature flags, and product analytics into one unified system so teams can ship safely, test rigorously, and directly link what they changed to how users actually behaved. So if you want to make learning your competitive advantage, whether you're building new AI experiences, or just evolving your existing core product, go to statsig.com slash acquired to get started. Well, Rulof, I know this is adapting and not acquired, but we have one bonus question that we decided if we ever had you on the show, after doing our deep dive on Square and doing the Square IPO, we had to ask you, what was it like navigating the challenging Square IPO and the months afterwards, sort of knowing what a predictable and good business it was, but just seeing what happened in the public markets after IPO'd.

This was like a key moment in acquired history. We can look back to the pre-square IPO episode and the post-square IPO episode because it was just such a stark story to us of a company that was a great company that had just even in the bull market run that we were in when they went public was so misjudged. It was really difficult and in the run up to the IPO because you have this quiet period, we couldn't really respond.

As often happens with these IPOs that people just keep on this negative, vicious cycle of negative press. And so it was a really painful to deal with that. And then you see the IPO price at $9. And I was arguing that I'd before that we should price a little bit higher at least so we have more in the balance sheet and then to see the way that it popped on the first day. And it was still not a great outcome even at the close price of the first day. But I felt that we left so much money on the table.

So the way to react in my mind was to rally the team and to talk about just, you know, we can't control our stock price, what we can control is our execution. And I think the management team did an incredible job of saying, look, it is what it is. We got through it. Let's hunker down and let's just build a great business and they did that. And then what we did as an investor is we were patient. So we didn't distribute a single square share until four years after the IPO, four years. And so That means that we distributed, and we still haven't fully distributed, by the way, because I have so much faith in this company. You're still on the board, correct? I'm still on the board. I love working with the team, I love working with Jack. I love the mission of the company around financial empowerment, and the fact that we're able to do that now, not only for small businesses, but also for consumers with a square cash app. I think it's a fabulous company to be associated with from a mission point of view, and the actual financial results.

my partners and myself, we were just really patient. And so the fact that it was $9 a shit IPO didn't matter because we distributed shares when it got to 80. And so at the end of the day, we made a much better return for our limited partners by being patient. And I think the team also appreciated us as a really patient investor. It's great. Thank you for sharing. And that's a good note to end on with. This moment in time too, right? Like, you know, for great companies.

they're going to survive, they're going to hunker down. And now is not the time to liquidate your shares. Yeah, I think it's focused on the long term. So real problems. Yeah. Well, on that note, rule off where can our listeners get in touch with you with Sequoia? My first name rule off at Sequoia cap.com. Great. And are you on Twitter? Yes. I'd rule off with a signed up in 2007. Nice. I've been a user for a long, long time.

That's awesome. Well, thank you for joining us, listeners. We hope you enjoyed this episode of adapting. Please send us feedback. Acquired FM at gmail.com or join our Slack and we'd love to talk to you there. Ruloff, thanks again. Thank you, Ben. Thank you, David.

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