Acquired - The Facebook IPO

0:00Hey acquired listeners, a note about this show before we get started. Ben and I recorded this episode the night before the 2016 election day in the United States. At the time, the biggest change we saw coming was adding a new type of content to acquired in analyzing IPOs, which we introduced in this episode. Two days later, we woke up to a very different world than the one we were expecting. Reflecting on what's happened and the past few months of our show, we wanted to say two things.

0:27First, we apologize for our cavalier attitude towards this election cycle over the past couple episodes. And our glossing over of the clearly very real problems and deep divide in America that it represented. In the Skype episode, I pretty glibly compared the AT&T Time Warner merger to Make America Great Again, arguing that any reactionary force is, quote, on the wrong side of history and cannot be relevant in a changing world. I was wrong.

0:56that sentiment is wrong, and it's insensitive to the very real pain that a lot of people are obviously feeling out there on both sides. Second, looking back on the episode, we think it actually presents a relevant parable for our country right now, and we hope some important lessons for the technology industry going forward. For all its wonderful aspects that we celebrate on the show, there is no doubt...

1:19in my mind that the tech industry shoulders a lot of the responsibility for the current divide in America and especially in its contribution to wealth and equality. Likewise, for all of the wonderful aspects to the Facebook IPO story that you're about to hear, there is a very clear dark side as well. Facebook shareholders, investment banks, and institutional investors raked in billions of dollars at the expense of public retail investors who lost their shirts. At the same time, Facebook's perseverance and their determination in overcoming what were massive existential challenges to their business model as you'll hear about in this episode at incredible speed. We think can be an inspiration to us all right now on how to move forward when it doesn't look like that's super possible. We hope you'll listen to this episode with that in mind and think about how you and we and the technology industry as a whole can do better in serving everyone in this country and in the world.

2:13Thanks for being on this journey with us. We're sorry for our shortcomings. We're going to keep working really hard to do better and with that on to the show. Welcome back to episode 25 of acquired, the podcast about technology acquisitions. Today's episode we're trying something new.

2:47We're piloting a new idea, analyzing IPOs in addition to our normal acquisition format. When we started the show, our goal was to understand what made an acquisition go spectacularly well. And over the past 24 episodes, we've started zooming out and asking ourselves exactly why that is. Both David and I are really trying to understand how to create big and enduring companies, and we know that's why a good chunk of our audience listens to the show.

3:10Oftentimes, you can have these huge successful acquisitions, but that's not the only goal. The goal, for us and for many entrepreneurs, is to create lasting value. As we thought about what direction we wanted to take the show, it became more and more clear to us that we should be looking at companies that don't get acquired, but go all the way to going public. And really, these are even a better example of building hugely valuable companies. So today, we're starting with a monumental IPO in recent history, Facebook. Oh yes.

3:40I'm really excited for this and I hope you guys are too. Not that we're gonna stop doing acquisitions, but we thought this was as Ben said just a great direction to take the show. So let us know what you think in the Slack channel by email on Twitter. We love feedback here and acquired. Very true. And in typical, I mean...

4:02Both of us are very involved with early-stage companies in different facets and in kind of typical customer validation and customer development format. Be harsh. We'd love all your criticism and we want to make a choir the best show possible if you guys so. It helps us make the show better. True that. All right, listeners. Now is a great time to talk about a new partner of ours here on Acquired. Lagora, the agentic operating system that is redefining how the world's best legal teams work.

4:32Yup, it's sort of obvious that AI is going to completely change the legal industry. I bet most of you listening have dropped a contract into some sort of AI chatbot out there. LaGora took that insight and asked the question, what if you really built something with that power from the ground up for the legal industry? So the founders did exactly what great founders do, operate with obsessive customer focus. They embedded inside a massive law firm.

4:58for months. They sat with the lawyers just watching how the work really gets done. And that's how you get features that customers love, like tabular review, where you drop in a folder of hundreds of contracts, and it pulls every key term into a grid a lawyer can actually work with. Legora's bed here is interesting. Since it lets each lawyer handle more complexity, any given person can increase the quality of their work and do higher value work. And this means that the pie can grow even as each individual task takes less time.

5:27And they recently launched LaGora agent offering greater intelligence and performance. The agent lets lawyers set an objective. Then it can handle the planning and the execution and delivery of the final product. Legal teams get to maintain full control and transparency since they're still involved where judgment is required. And LaGora works where you already work. You can use it within Microsoft Word while redlining or drafting the early LaGora numbers essentially.

5:55speak for themselves. When they have a head-to-head pilot with their top competitor, they win 70% of the time. Legora now has over a hundred thousand lawyers on the platform from 1200 legal teams in 50 countries. And crazily, they went from one million to a hundred million in ARR in about 18 months. Truly insane numbers. And that is the real test.

6:20Plenty of things demo well, but the question is whether a busy associate actually reaches for it during crunch time or whether a partner trusts it before going into a conversation with a major client. If your legal team wants to check it out, whether you're a law firm or you're in house at a company, you can learn more at logora.com slash acquired and just tell them that Ben and David sent you. All right. You want to go into the IPO history and facts with that. This is an epic one to start with.

6:50So I'm gonna assume that most of our audience is familiar with the Facebook founding story. You know, if you're not, we highly recommend you go watch the social network. Or if you'd like a less fabricated version, the David Kirkpatrick book or there's a variety of good resources and we would do a much worse job telling that story here than you could get elsewhere. Yes. Much ink has been spilled on that front. But suffice to say.

7:15that Facebook was founded in 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg, Eduardo Savarin, Andrew McCollum, the forgotten Facebook founder, Dustin Moskovitz and Chris Hughes, a whole bunch of stuff happened, including turning down several acquisition offers along the way, most notably a $1 billion acquisition offer by Yahoo in 2006, just...

7:36when the company was two years old, sort of foreshadowing Instagram in years to come. And I think Mark has talked about turning down that acquisition being one of the pivotal moments in the history of the company. And that's the kind of like crisis moment in the bathroom.

7:54I think he like there was a point there where he I'll have to check my facts on this and we can do it and follow up But I think this is the one where it was over dinner and he ended up in the bathroom like looking at himself in the mirror and having this emotional crisis of oh my god Am I actually turning down a billion dollar offer? Yeah, crazy, but he did and Facebook went on to much more than a billion dollars in value so much so that if you Google the Facebook IPO and you find yourself on the Wikipedia page there's a whole Wikipedia page dedicated to the Facebook IPO and right in the beginning it

8:29refers to it as a quote, cultural touchstone. Yeah, and that's no joke. I mean, it's one of the largest acquisitions of all time. I'm sorry, one of the largest IPOs of all time. Indeed, the third largest behind Visa and General Motors, but probably happier than those two since those were. At least General Motors was post financial crisis when the US government was re-IPOing it after the bailout. But talk about enduring companies to study. Yeah.

8:58So, let's dive into it. In the late days of Facebook as a private company, which it spent eight years from 2004 until 2012 as a private company, it was a frenzy, not just inside the company, but outside the company. Everybody and their mother, literally, their mother wanted to be an investor in Facebook.

9:25At the time, there were actually two ways to sites that had popped up that would let you do that. There were these vehicles called Second Market and Shares Post. And these were...

9:40startups themselves that facilitated trading private company stock. You had to be an accredited investor to do this. This was before the Jobs Act and before a lot of the new equity crowdfunding laws and regulations. Did you have to be an accredited investor to sell or just to buy? Just to buy. But employees could sell on these sites and the vast majority of all volume being traded on these sites was...

10:05Facebook shares in 2010, 2011. And this was starting to be a really big problem because now all of a sudden Facebook and other companies that were who shares were trading on these sites, they'd sort of lost control of these shares and they had all these shareholders out there who they didn't know who they were. And at the time pre-jobs act, the laws were that you had to have less than 500 shareholders as a private company. Once you had more than 500 shareholders, you had to go public. And so this was happening in Facebook more than any other company at the time. And in an effort to sort of try and also get under this 500 shareholder rule in 2011, and to be January 2011, Facebook

10:59Separately, did a rather infamous deal with Goldman Sachs. That didn't go so well. The first part of the deal went fine, and that was that Goldman invested $450 million itself in Facebook. That happened. But the second part of the deal, and that was at a $50 billion valuation.

11:17The second part of the deal was that Goldman was going to create a special purpose vehicle that was going to be one single entity and then it was going to market to its private wealth management clients the ability to invest in this special purpose vehicle that was going to be a billion and a half in total and then that would invest that would Vehicle would invest in Facebook and so they sent this email out to select private wealth management clients of Goldman saying here opportunity of a lifetime. It was like a Nigerian cash scam email that Goldman was sending out to their clients. They couldn't even, they didn't even, couldn't even say the company by name. It was a unnamed, high growth private company that they were offering the opportunity once in a lifetime an opportunity to invest in. Wow. But you throw the Goldman brand behind that and it seems like, yeah, she seemed like a good idea at the time and to Facebook too. Well, the SEC didn't think it was such a good idea. So deal

12:18New York Times deal book actually leaked scooped that this was happening and after that the SEC started investigating and Goldman ended up they still ended up doing the deal but they did it with all foreign clients so they decided that it was too risky to have US investors invest in the deal and this was a huge huge moment big egg on Goldman's face and on Facebook's face for what came across as really trying to skirt US securities laws. And up until that point, Goldman had been sort of top bill in the running to be the bank that would take Facebook public. And this basically killed their chances of being lead left, quote unquote, on the IPO.

13:09And what is for for those of us like kind of not from the industry was lead left so when investment bankers take a speaking as a Reformed investment banker myself when investment bankers take a company public There's usually a consortium of banks that underwrite the IPO But there's one bank that's the leader and that's referred to as being lead left quote-unquote which is on the cover of the perspective of the IPO the bank that's at the top and on the left is lead left and they get the biggest allocation of the IPO. And it's always a huge battle amongst the big bulge bracket banks for hot IPOs, and there was never going to be any IPO hotter than Facebook to be the lead left. Not only because they'd make a lot of money from it, but the prestige associated with that, well, in theory, we'll see what really happened, live on for a long time.

14:01So because of these two things that were happening, there was immense pressure on Facebook to finally go public in the 2012 timeframe. So late 2011, they start preparing. They actually select Morgan Stanley, Goldman's longtime rival, to be lead left. They're deep preparing for the IPO.

14:24Business is going great. For the year of 2011, they ended the year with 845 million monthly active users, 483 million daily active users. So doing the math on that, that's over 50% DAU to MAU ratio, which means over half of Facebook's users used it every single day, which is just incredible.

14:52but still to this day, there's so few products that are like that. And not just usage, but engagement. So they were seeing at the end of 2011, over 2.7 billion likes and comments per day, which is crazy. And by the time they actually went public in 2012, they amended their S1 filing to include Q1 numbers. And in Q1 2012, they saw 3.2 billion likes and comments every single day. Which those likes and comments numbers, they like to put that in there. It's like almost an unfathomable ridiculous vanity metric, right? Because there's nothing to compare it to. And we really like, it's hard to wrap your head around what that even means. Well, but it's engagement, right? I mean, it's like, it's people aren't just opening the app. They're actually doing stuff in the app. Great point.

15:45And in these days, we'll get to this in a second. It wasn't so much the app as it was the website on desktop. And not only, you know, things are going really well for Facebook at this point. Not only do they have these huge, unprecedented user base, unprecedented engagement, but they are making real money too.

16:04Yeah, they were profitable by their IPO, correct? Very profitable. So in 2011, they did $3.7 billion in revenue and over $1.7 billion in operating income, which is really incredible. You think of a private startup at that point in time. People had never seen a private company at this scale of both revenue and profitability. Right.

16:29And that's, let's see, that's a 45.9% operating margin. Yeah. It's it's it's quite good. As we were talking about a bit before the show, hiring Cheryl Sandberg to build advertising at Facebook was one of if not the best decision that Mark Zuckerberg ever made. Yeah, this is this is worth a quick little story, but before March of 2008, Facebook didn't have Cheryl Sandberg at the helm as COO and they had no ad product. They were just running banner ads. Yeah, and they cut some deal with Microsoft. Mark was totally allergic to cannibalizing the purity of the site with advertising and in March of 2008, Cheryl Sandberg came in and her goal and her charter was make the company profitable.

17:22Before she joined, quote-unquote, the company was primarily interested in building a really cool site, profits they assumed would follow. And so in late spring, Facebook's leadership team finally agreed that they were going to rely on advertising with the ads, quote-unquote, discreetly presented. And then it was kind of her charter over the next three years to actually build a...

17:43an in-house competency coming from Google of a real advertising platform. And in three years to go from essentially nothing like they were making plenty of revenue, but it was low quality revenue from banner ads to go from essentially nothing to almost four billion in revenue and almost two billion in profit. Totally wild.

18:04Interestingly, this is a fun side fact. This was the days of Facebook platform and games on Facebook and particularly Farmville. And they noted in their S1 filing that Zingo represented 15% of Facebook revenue at the time of the IPO. That's a huge risk. Yeah, that was in the risk factors. So as we're alluding to things that go in great February 1st, The big day, the day that everybody in tech has been waiting for, they file Facebook files, it's S1, which happens, now it happens before you go public, you file your registration statement, the prospectus for going public. In those days, it happened even.

18:52Longer before before the actual IPO happens now. It's a fairly short time period after some of the changes made in the jobs act So February 1st they file Morgan Stanley's lead left banker and then showing how far Goldman had fallen just a year earlier You know, they were in the pole position to be lead left they actually get demoted to third so JP Morgan Is second and Goldman is third so this was a big big demotion for Goldman And but as we shall see, Morgan's being lead left on the Facebook IPO wasn't necessarily the golden egg that the banks thought it was. So things are great, but there's one one problem with Facebook right now. And that problem is mobile. Yeah, so fascinatingly enough in the.

19:45in their S1 when they're listing the summary risk factors to the business. This one's incredible. One of the risk factors is growth in use of Facebook through our mobile products where we do not currently display ads as a substitute for use on personal computers may negatively affect our revenue and financial results. So the risk factor they're identifying here is not that, you know, we don't know how we're going to monetize the phone. We haven't rolled out phone ads yet. It's that The risk is that people start using mobile products more than desktop products and we don't have a revenue model there. Yeah, they literally had no revenue model. So two huge, two aspects to this.

20:30Very huge problem for Facebook right now. The mobile problem. One is a usage and engagement problem, and they had, we just talked about this incredible usage and engagement metrics that they had, but that's all on desktop. On mobile, they have mobile apps for Facebook, but these are the dark ages of HTML5 and the misery of the HTML5 mobile Facebook app, which was so slow, basically impossible to use. And as a result, only about half, half to slightly less than half of Facebook's users were active on mobile. Yeah. And like, fascinating to think about.

21:15All the implications to mobile being an afterthought like when you when you opened the app the the news feed as we know it today was not one unified news feed where you would see the same thing on the mobile app that you would on desktop It was like you would see a completely different set of information like a different algorithm determining what you would see serve down you a different way cashed in a different way obviously not nearly as responsive this was you know, philosophically, they wanted to be able to move faster by dynamically controlling the HTML that was served down without having to reset it to the apps. And not making a bet on, you know, this was, as we've talked about on the show, the age of the mobile platform wars and iOS going to win are Android and they thought they could be really flexible by having this HTML 5 app that was one app that would get put in a wrapper and shipped to both app stores.

22:03But yeah, it was not working. No. And it's fun even doing the research for this episode. I read a bunch of articles about this and I remember doing this. Most a lot of people rather than installing or using the app on their phone for Facebook, they would go to m.facebook.com and use the mobile web because it was better than the crappy app that they had. Yeah.

22:27Shocking which and I mean this was in tech years You know four years four plus years ago four and a half years ago a long time But it's not like the mobile ecosystem was undeveloped at this point in time like there were app like Uber existed right there was no excuse for not having I think Twitter had already bought Tweety so the iOS client for Twitter was exceptional at that time. Yeah Tweety became the native app and the like to put this in perspective.

22:58where they had no ability to monetize on mobile at this point. And that was the, so one half of the huge gaping chest wound that Facebook had at this point was the abs sucked. And then the other half was they had no monetization model. They made no money from mobile. And to put that in perspective today, David I'll tell us the story of kind of everything along the way. Facebook's earnings came out a couple of weeks ago. And mobile advertising revenue represented 84% of ad revenue for the quarter. Yeah, so that was the third quarter of 2016 as we're recording this today. And it's basically the entire business today. So the story of how we got there is massively tied up in the Facebook IPO.

23:44And actually, even just a couple months later after the IPO in September 2012, Zuckerberg was on stage a tech crunch disrupt that year. And he said, the biggest mistake we've made as a company is betting on HTML5 over native in mobile. That's how...

24:03how much over a few short months he realized what a big problem he had. Wow. And it's probably worth before diving back into the story to set some context on the numbers here. So IPO, biggest in technology history, third largest of all time, priced at the market cap for Facebook was 104 billion. Which we'll get into in a sec.

24:26Okay, cool. Yeah, why don't you just dive in then? Okay, so we're still on the road to IPO and it's now April. Facebook has been working on its road show and getting presenting to investors, large institutions who will buy into the IPO.

24:47And on April 9th, 2012, they come out with a rather shocking announcement at the time that we've already covered on this show in one of our early episodes. And that is in fact our benchmark of what a great acquisition is. They announced that they're acquiring Instagram. And we talked about this a little bit on the episode, but just to step back again here and put this in the context of how crazy this was that Facebook was had filed their S1. They're in the process of going public and they acquire a company that has 13 employees for a billion dollars that this was just crazy. But underscores how much, how Mark and Cheryl and the team were coming to realize how big of a problem mobile was for them. And the entire rationale for the Instagram acquisition was around bolstering their story and their user base in mobile. Yeah. And I remember trying to rationalize this at the time and talking to friends. And I think we've even talked about this on the Instagram episode that there were a few things that Facebook

25:57held near and dear. And one of which was being the source of platform and identity. And that was quickly becoming really important to them to get a foothold in that everybody sort of needed a Facebook as its infrastructure on the internet. But the killer app for Facebook was photos sharing. It's what got by far the most engagement. It was nostalgic. All those comments and likes. Billions every day. Yeah.

26:19And so for them to lose that foothold where that's really their core of strength is this is where people share and engage on photos. That's a total existential threat, especially when everyone's attention is shifting to mobile and they don't have a credible offering there. Yep. And they actually, you know, in this time leading up to the actual IPO, Facebook was and most companies do amend their S1.

26:43registration statement quite frequently as new information comes up and they're and they're working through feedback from investors and whatnot. And of course, they amend it for this acquisition that they announced. And they actually say, it's interesting, they say in the S1 that they intend to continue operating Instagram as a standalone entity in product, which we talked about on our show, but it's interesting that they actually put that in the S1 for Facebook's IPO. But then they also say, this is after they talk about Instagram, but in the same paragraph, We believe that mobile usage of Facebook is critical to maintaining user growth and engagement over the long term. And we are actively seeking to grow mobile usage, although such usage does not currently directly generate any meaningful revenue. This is how important they're realizing it's becoming. Also interesting side note that I found while I was doing research here.

27:38There was a breakup fee on the Instagram acquisition of $200 million. So if for whatever reason, the acquisition didn't go through Facebook would have paid Instagram $200 million. Wow. Wow. That's enormous because Instagram, like a lot of the time you're going to have a break up fee like that because of the incredible cost that you incur by, you know, opportunity cost and negotiation and like the usually it's you know you see those things often when it's like a public company acquiring another public company it's impacting the stock price but this was a 13 person startup right and it's not like when we were talking to Zillow CFO Kathleen Phillips how like the the negative signal that it could send to the market

28:25to Trulia's shareholders, and to Trulia's incredible number of stakeholders from the advertisers to all the people that depended on them. Instagram didn't have a lot of stakeholders. Instagram didn't have a high opportunity cost of other things. They could be doing the tune of $200 million. It's not even had more than a few people working on the acquisition. It was Kevin and Mark talking.

28:47and some very excited VCs on their board. Yeah, no kidding. Wild that it's at high. So things keep moving along in the process. On May 9th, Facebook files the sixth amendment to its S1. We're going to come back to that in a minute. Things keep going along. And mid May, they decide that they're going to set May 18th as the day. Friday, May 18th is the day that Facebook goes public. So the start of that week though, something that There's an inauspicious start, and that's at the beginning of the week GM, that we've already talked about on this episode, General Motors, announces that they're gonna stop all advertising on Facebook, because it's not actually working that well for them. And they've been spending $10 million a year with Facebook. And they wanted flashier ad units. I mean, their major complaint was, look, on all these blogs, they're letting us take over the whole back page. We can slide stuff in from the sides. We can get this big header that pushes all

29:44the content down and all we get are these crummy little, you know, static ads on Facebook on the side. And I don't know if they had started news feed ads at that point. But either way, the ad formats on Facebook have historically been so much more limiting than the kind of arguably user hostile things that you get across the advertising ecosystem on the web.

30:06But no matter $10 million, that's a big account, but Facebook made $3.7 billion the past year. So dropping the bucket, things proceed. The night before the IPO Thursday night, Facebook holds an all night hackathon leading up to the IPO. And then in the morning, everybody's been up all night. And the whole company rings the bell for the NASDAQ remotely, remotely from California and Zuckerberg pushes the button and big fanfare.

30:36and then the company's supposed to start trading. And so they priced the IPO the night before. They priced at $38 per share, which gives Facebook a market capitalization of $104 billion at IPO.

30:53Again, unprecedented in technology history. And how many they sell enough shares to consist of how much value? They sell 421 million shares at $38 a share, raising $16 billion in the IPO. And about half of that, the company keeps, and about half of that is selling shareholders that are monetizing their shares. So the Zuckerberg presses the button in the morning.

31:20everything's supposed to begin trading and actually when companies go public on the NASDAQ, they actually delay trading a little bit so that at the open, the stocks isn't start trading right away, they have a little time to make it orderly because usually there's a lot of interest in IPOs and a lot of trades are happening. So the Facebook was supposed to start trading at 11.05 am Eastern time on Friday, May 18th.

31:5011.05 comes, people are placing trades, no trades are happening. The NASDAQ is broken. Facebook has literally broken the NASDAQ. I mean, it's functioning for all other stocks, but what NASDAQ would later describe as a technical error occurs. And this just unleashes mayhem on the Facebook stock.

32:14Traders are placing orders, and they don't know if they're gonna get filled at all. Plenty of orders placed during this time period aren't filled. Plenty of orders. Or if they're gonna get filled at the wrong price, so a lot of orders actually get filled at the wrong price. At a higher price than what people were placing them at. This is a disaster of...

32:33epic proportions on NASDAQ's part. And actually ends up contributing, this really hurts NASDAQ. I mean, up until this point, NASDAQ had always been the place for technology companies and all the tech companies were on the NASDAQ and the old school companies were on the New York Stock Exchange.

32:48After this, I mean, NASDAQ still has plenty of tech IPOs, but the New York Stock Exchange really makes a push. Yep. So when Twitter ends up going public, they do it on the New York Stock Exchange. Fitbit, Grubhub, Zendesk, lots of tech companies are now using the NYSE. And a lot of it is because of this. So it's pretty bad. And eventually, NASDAQ actually settles two lawsuits. The SEC Files are sued against them. They pay $10 million to the SEC and then a shareholder class action lawsuit against them because of this for people who lost money in the Facebook IPO. And NASDAQ ends up paying $26.5 million to shareholders as a result. So once it all gets sorted out though, later in the day, Facebook does begin trading. And it's pretty clear that things are not going well.

33:42The stock ends the day at 38.23, so up 23 cents from offering price. But that's a really bad sign, because that means they didn't get a pop from lots of excess demand and people wanting to buy the stock. And what that usually means, and this is what happened in this case, that the underrating banks ended up supporting the stock, because they've staked their reputation on this IPO. They don't want to let the price fall below the offering price. And so they end up more in stance Finally, JP Morgan Goldman Sachs end up buying a lot of shares to support the price on this first day of trading. Well, that doesn't sound sustainable. No, and it doesn't because the next trading day, which is the following Monday,

34:27It's a bloodbath so market opens on Monday and within 15 minutes of trading starts Facebook is down almost 14% Which doesn't sound like a lot, but like stocks don't fall stocks don't move 14% in one day Also, I mean that if you think about like that that means that like 15 billion dollars of market cap was just erased immediately. I mean, that'd be like, if the whole market moved that much, that'd be like the day I was losing like 2000 points in one day. And this is the second day, Facebook's second day as a public company. That's like destroying like 14 Instagrams.

35:04Yeah, immediately. So not good. And it's so not good that it actually trips what's called a circuit breaker. That stock exchanges have built into them that if a stock starts really getting pummeled like this, they'll stop trading in it. So that short sellers. Just for that stock. Yeah. So that short sellers can't like aggressively bash the price down. So this is really bad.

35:30ends up closing that day at about $34 a share, which is down 11%. The next day on Wednesday, I guess Wednesday two days later, the stock opens, closes down another nine, oh sorry, Tuesday closes down another 9% at $31 a share. Wednesday, the stock opens, and news hits that Facebook is getting slammed with a shareholder lawsuit, because news is leaked that that sixth revision that I mentioned to the S1 prospectus a couple weeks before the IPO. Well, it turns out that there was actually a little more to that story than just revising the S1, and what happens is that that was the first day of the official road show for Facebook on May 9th.

36:20Mark and Cheryl and the executive team were doing the road show, and at the end of the day, David Ebersman, who was the CFO of Facebook at the time. It takes Morgan Stanley aside and says to them, hey, we're actually going to lower our guidance for what we expect revenue and earnings to be for the second quarter. Wow. And you don't do this when you're on your IPO roadshow information. Yeah, well, it's private information, but a, you don't, so they were giving guidance as part of the roadshow to institutional investors. Sort of like, You could think of it like practicing your earnings calls, but investors are going to want to know what management's outlook is for the future. It's practicing your earnings call, but to one shareholder and not all the other people who are like, well, right. They just given the first part of the, you know, a road show with the old estimates. And so now they have to figure out what to do. But the other thing is you don't, you don't lower your guidance during the road show. You lower it before you go out on the road show. Once you started,

37:23What would you do in this situation if you got news that you should know like that it's going to come in lower if you were in the middle of your road show. How do you fix that? Well, you probably don't do what Facebook and Morgan Stanley did, which is they decide that they're going to call the equity research analysts that are going to cover Facebook and they're going to disclose this news. And the reason for this, by the way, is that mobile was really hurting them. So they were terrified that they were going to come in below Expectations because they were behind on mobile and people were switching over to mobile faster than they could get products out the door and get monetization done So they call up the research analysts, but they call the research analyst of the underwriting banks and they tell them that this they're gonna revise earnings down and so

38:12The underwriting banks, Morgan Stanley and JP Morgan and Goldman, they all call their clients, their institutional investors, which are mutual funds and hedge funds, and they tell them, hey, Facebook, you know, this IPO that's going to be the IPO of this century next week, they actually just revised their forecast down. So you've now got this situation where the public has no idea that any of this is happening. But all the big institutions know all the clients of the banks that are doing the underwriting for the deal. And so We find out much later, but there was a huge amount of short-selling pressure on the Facebook stock at the IPO because all these banks are like, well, now there's an information asymmetry. Like, I know something you don't know. They should capitalize that on behalf of their clients. I mean, that's what they do. So is what they did a securities violation? Like, is that legal? Well, it's a very much a gray area. And they actually

39:09Facebook never gets in any trouble for this, but Morgan Stanley takes a big reputational hit and ends up settling a lawsuit actually with the Massachusetts state regulators. I'm not sure why it was Massachusetts and not the federal SEC, but the only lawsuit that ends up getting settled and it's not that much money Morgan Stanley pays $5 million in the settlement to Massachusetts for this.

39:37tacitly admit wrongdoing here, and this is a big oopsie for them. Yeah, it's crazy thinking about in these highly controlled environments like this, that a side conversation like the two of them had can create ripples of that magnitude.

39:56Well, when you're talking about a $16 billion IPO, that is literally the biggest in technology history, and you've just created this information asymmetry, and it's going to be the most watched by all parties, including the SEC of all time. Well, when you phrase it that way, David. Not a good...

40:15Not to not species beginning. So all told when all this is done, the first two weeks of Facebook as a public company are terrible. The stock goes down during nine of the first 13 trading days. And by the end of May, so two weeks after the IPO, Facebook had lost a quarter of its value. And remember at IPO, the $100 billion market cap, so $25 billion in value just wiped out. The Wall Street Journal calls the IPO quote, a fiasco. And so then what do you do? So now you're the company, your mark, your Cheryl. You go from being the most hyped IPO in history to literally a fiasco with all these shareholder lawsuits flying around. You've got this gaping chest wound of not figuring out mobile.

41:05Yeah, so to me there's there's two things going on here one is the PR thing that you have to manage and the entire like financial ecosystem that you're now a part of and you really have to You know we've carefully here on on you know your next few quarters are gonna be watched so carefully You've taken a huge reputational hit people are afraid of buying your stock other people are opportunistic and getting in and feeling like it's maybe a little risky But then the other thing that's kind of going on here is You know, Facebook just needs to inwardly look at their product, and this is really what they do is say, look, all of these symptoms that are happening in the financial market are because of the problem that one, we don't have a credible, like a great mobile experience, and two, everyone shifting the mobile anyway, even with our crummy experience, and we don't have an ability to monetize there. And, you know,

42:02The interesting thing is it doesn't take them too much longer to actually launch, which I'm sure you'll tell us about in a moment, to launch their mobile assets product. But it is so interesting that as a management team, they took a step back, focused on the fundamentals, focused on improving the product, focused on serving their customers, and actually rebounded from this with a very strong step into mobile.

42:30For me and you know when we get into grading in a minute here like this is the defining moment for at least the I the public company, you know part of Facebook's journey like this is what why they are a great company and why Mark and Cheryl are great leaders. I mean It would have been so easy to hit the panic button with everything going on here. I mean the amount of pressure was just immense But they do exactly what you said they they they spend the rest of the summer completely focused on mobile. And this is when you hear about Facebook has a very unique corporate culture, but they have essentially like a propaganda department that makes posters and puts them up around campus in Menlo Park. And posters all of a sudden went up all over campus, like mobile is our future. And they get the whole company in the period of just one summer, basically completely

43:28focused on mobile. They spend all summer working on native apps. August 23rd, they release their native iOS app. The native Android app comes a little later. And then shortly thereafter, it's not like they release that and the markets like, oh great, problems are solved. On September 4th, Facebook hits its all time low at $17.73 a share, which puts their market cap at about $49 billion. So they've just lost $50 billion of market cap. This is really the depths here. But they release a product. It's a great product. People love the iOS app. And more importantly, it has the ability to insert ads into the feed. And now the age of the native ad and advertising in the Facebook feed on mobile is

44:23born and kind of like a Phoenix rising from the ashes, it's just incredible. So they don't turn on advertising in Q3, but Q4 of 2012, they do turn on advertising on mobile and they go from literally zero dollars to 23% of the entire ad revenue for the whole company comes in via mobile on in Q4. Wow.

44:49which is amazing because when you think about where they've transformed to today, they basically have cracked advertising on mobile. I mean, the newsfeed ad unit is the best ad unit. And I think that...

45:07for when we shifted to mobile everybody tried to move their banners down to tiny little banners, and that didn't work very well. And now I remember like millennial media and I had a mob and all that stuff. I had launched my career. I tell you that's right. Yeah. In C's the day, we benefited from Apple, which is an app that you built while you're in college, right? Yep. It's kind of one of the early to-do lists in the store. We launched and we were one of the first partners.

45:35to have I add in there. And we had like, particular CPMs and Apple featured us. So like, there was like, I think Nissan Leaf was like one of three advertisers that actually bought at anyway. So banner ads like didn't work very well. Apple has since sunset at I add. A lot of publishers are moving to just putting their square desktop ads in the middle of articles. People are getting closer with these sort of like native ads embedded into, you know, publisher.

46:01Publish your formats but really what really works on mobile is a native Facebook ad and like when you're scrolling through that newsfeed Well, you know, you scroll sort of whatever you stop at every story to pause and look at what it is and for that brief moment The advertiser has the opportunity to take over your entire captive attention in a way that they never could on desktop. Yep, and like Facebook cracked it and it's they're they're they're the fact that 40% of their revenue today and as a hugely successful company comes from Mobile advertising is a huge testament to them turning it around they cracked it I mean in a period of about six months while going public with the and while acquiring Instagram They basically invented the mobile added history And and I think a really nice way of

46:51putting a bow on and tying up the Facebook IPO story is that the next year, TechCrunch Disrupt 2013. So in 2012, Zuckerberg had said, Zuckerberg said in an interview on stage that HTML5 was the biggest mistake that he'd made in the history of the company. In 2013, TechCrunch Disrupt, Michael Earrington asked Zuckerberg on stage, you know, So how about that IPO? And Zack says, you know, this is a quote he says, I'm the person you would want to ask last on how to do a smooth IPO. But, and this is, you know, this is a year later, he says, but it's actually a valuable process. Having gone through a terrible first year as it made our company a lot stronger, you have to know everything about your company. It took us to the next level and we run our company much better now.

47:47Pretty interesting. Pretty interesting. Yeah. All right, listeners. Now is a great time to tell you about a longtime friend of the show, Vanta. AI has scrambled the whole security picture. It used to be that you proved that you were secure once a year, an audit or a static PDF, then everyone would not, and you're done. But in an AI first world, that doesn't hold up anymore. Yep. Your risk surface changes every week now.

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49:38So should we go into what would have happened otherwise what would have happened otherwise Well, I think this is a kind of a natural point of segue because in one of the things that I was thinking about and what would have happened otherwise is sort of three things that That you get when you IPO three sort of like advantageous components to it the first is an influx of cash Obviously Facebook's going to raise $67 billion in cash that goes directly to marketable securities or cash on hand for the company.

50:11The rest obviously goes to investors who are existing investors who are catching out. The second is the fact that if they're going to do M&A transactions in the future, having public company stock way more valuable than difficult to value private company stock. Not necessarily more valuable, but the industry term is it's a liquid currency. In that you can assign a value, you can say one share of Facebook stock is worth X on the public market. I can tell you with certainty it is worth $17.73 on September 4th as opposed to I don't know what's a share in PSL worth been It's a little speculative at this point exactly And that ties into our third two is liquidity for shareholders So when you IPO, you know, you've got all these employees that have been working for private company stock options for years a lot of them having purchased them and

51:03you know, they can't really get liquid. They can sort of use the second market using shares post and second market. Yeah, so it's interesting that like some of the trials and tribulations of the IPO can be attributed to the fact that there was a sort of a value assigned to the company by the transactions that were going on in second market, but there were so few of them that it was a pretty illiquid marketplace. So you've got this like, Very rough estimate of what the companies were sort of setting and guiding what they're going to IPO for and You know if they had an IPO you could have even more of this going on and the longer they wait the more difficult it gets because people are super anxious to get liquid on the this you know Part of their compensation that they held for years a lot of it life-changing amounts of money. Yeah, I mean, I think I think I'd see here that a lot of the

52:00Clear bungling of the IPO was probably a result of just waiting too long and there was so much pent-up pressure there You know pressure to perform pressure to the last the round that Goldman had done that they'd botched with the letting private wealth management clients invest via this special purpose vehicle. That was at a $50 billion valuation. So Facebook wanted to deliver a 2X return on that, wanted to hit the Mythical $100 billion market cap. I think it was just a lot of brand then. They were forced to by a second market and shares post and the lack of having the jobs act. Which is funny because you were saying that

52:42that while they were on the road show is when the Jobs Act got started. Yeah, so the Jobs Act actually gets passed into law while they're working on the IPO. So ironically, they could have avoided a lot of this pressure if they just waited a little bit, but they didn't know that at the time. Yeah, and it really did seem like what would have happened otherwise, like if they had stayed private, to their knowledge, it wasn't gonna get passed and they shouldn't count on it and they sort of were forced to IPO. If they had continued to wait longer, like actually we're seeing a lot of companies do today.

53:11You run into these sort of issues where early investors need to get their money out. And they are going to, I don't know, do big secondaries. And you're going to have the same sort of issues that we're having today with the super unicorns, which we should talk about in tech themes. But another big one that I think is worth talking about is the fact that they went under a tremendous amount of scrutiny by going public. Like this really forced management to understand every facet of the business and understand where their huge key risk factors were. I really think that the most interesting part of that as that as one is where they identify risk to the business because truly like it they probably were working on the some of the mobile advertising stuff beforehand but like it is a huge slap in the face and like a huge wake up call to realize

54:04our business has an existential crisis on its hand. And so many other companies got destroyed in the wake of mobile and it was interesting that Facebook was able to kind of like keep their head above water until they really kind of came out and thrived. Yeah. And I think it's such a testament to...

54:21Mark and Cheryl leading this company to do that because you know, it's kind of like a running joke in the industry that like you know risk factors quote-unquote in S ones are like a joke like you know, you have to put them in there So let's make up some like phony risk to our business that actually make us sound stronger But as part of you know, I think because of all this disaster That the IPO process became they had to really answer to like what these risks meant and they saw literally half of the value of the company evaporate before their eyes. And what stronger wake up call to could there be to understanding that they had a big problem, they had effects. Right. And I guess they could have priced lower and gotten the pop that they were looking for. Maybe they just...

55:09got out ahead of their skis a little bit and could have like weathered this first year by you know pricing at 70% getting a little pop up to like 75% and then you know over the next 18 months then really kind of turning the gas on but and it's interesting they definitely could have done that but like to what would have happened otherwise would they then have noticed like would the magnifying lens have been shown as brightly on how big a problem mobile was. And would they have, again, fixed the product, fixed them, had model, fixed the monetization model, invented a new ad unit within six months. Yeah, pretty crazy. Pretty crazy. All right, tech themes. Yeah, let's do it. The biggest thing that I think we both really want to talk about here, we would chat a little bit before the episode, this totally changed the way that tech companies IPO.

56:01it was a cultural touchdown according to Wikipedia. Which is of course according to something else because Wikipedia makes no claims to be correct but rather referenceable. It actually it was a reference to I forget what article labeled it a cultural touchdown. Yeah yeah but I mean we we um Companies that were IPO'ing before were averaging three, four, five years before the IPO. Facebook went eight and had this total calamity on their hands. And, you know, we went through a pretty rough patch last year where there were just not a lot of tech IPOs and bleeding into early this year. And I think you can probably speak to this better than I can, but we're definitely in a period where people are waiting longer now. And that seems like you can kind of trace that back to Facebook. It's so interesting, I think.

56:47One of the lessons that Silicon Valley and the tech world seems to have absorbed from the Facebook IPO is don't go public. It's terrible. And the IPO was indeed terrible, as we've said. But what's so interesting is like, Zach would be the first one to refute that, right? Like in his quoted, you know, a year later, a tech hunch disrupt, like, It was great for the company. It forced them to really, you know, step up and play with the big boys, play in big boy land and big girl land. But the lesson that's been taken is totally opposite. So, Ben, you're referencing this. I pulled some numbers on some tech companies, well-known tech companies that went public before Facebook and how long between founding and when they went public. So, Zingo went public before Facebook a couple of months before.

57:38four and a half years from founding to IPO, which is crazy to think about. Zingo was built on the back of exploiting opportunities within Facebook, right? Like, Facebook may have been whatever 12% or something, like, uh, or 16%. 15% 15% reliant on Zingo, but Zingo was like 100% reliant on Facebook. And then when they moved, like, ran into big troubles when they tried to move off of Facebook and kind of control their entire ecosystem with their own website. Yeah, I realized they had no control.

58:05Another company, similarly Groupon, three years from founding to IPO. I think I was at the TechCrunch to strap when Andrew Mason was on stage and said never take your company public. Yeah, right. This was what people were entrepreneurs were internalizing from this. Zillow, which we covered six years.

58:24Pandora seven and a half years, people thought that was a really long time to go from founding to public. You know, the VCs were dying to get out of that company. Um, LinkedIn that we covered six and a half years. Um, so that was kind of like the normal before Facebook, after Facebook, like, like you said, Ben, you know, there's the really great companies haven't even gone public, but the ones that have like Etsy.

58:4910 years, Shopify 11 years, Fitbit 8.5 years, Atlassian 13.5 years, Twilio 9 years this year. People are staying private a really long time and not just staying private, but raising just absurd amounts of money. Google, right? It's so funny to see the evolution of the generations of tech companies and how they treat...

59:15you know, behave in the private markets. Generations in the last 20 years, right? Well, generations and tech companies are about four years. It's like going to college. Google raised $25 million before they went public. Facebook raised, you know, kind of two to three billion dollars when you include that Goldman round before going public without the Goldman round, you know, somewhere around a billion or so.

59:41Uber has now raised 11 and a half billion dollars over the eight years or so that It's insane that you can raise 11 billion dollars without having to like be under the scrutiny of a public company And I guess I mean, that's that's totally the sighted advantage right is like we don't have to disclose all these things It's better for competitive reasons, but like really it's for a lot of these but the reality is just worse for everybody Yeah, yeah, it's worse for the companies because you're not accountable to these massive challenges that you're facing. Like, what if, like, let's imagine, let's do another, what would it happen otherwise for Uber? Like, let's say instead of raising the last couple billion dollars, Uber had gone public and was staring down this DD situation in China as a public company. And would have

1:00:30been forced to really fix it. It turns out that hundreds of years of standard accounting principles and having to disclose in this very standard format is actually quite good for keeping discipline for the business.

1:00:49And it's not, you know, it's not good for investors, right? Because investors now, the reason, you know, and what you've seen since the Facebook IPO is obviously like the age of the unicorn has existed. And that's, that's twofold, you know, it's one company staying private longer and not wanting to go public. But then related is that investors, all the people that we're investing in these IPOs, like, their business model is predicated on getting cash into companies at this stage. So you've seen T-Row price, you've seen Fidelity, you've seen Tiger Global, the hedge fund, you've seen Dragonear and XYZ other public markets investors start doing late-stage private venture rounds because...

1:01:30That's what they've always done. It's just now those deals are happening in private instead of in public. It's bad for the company. It's bad for the investors because they don't get the disclosure and it's terrible for the public because you can't buy these stocks. It's really kind of anti-patriotic. Follow me on this, but the American prosperity is built on the fact that for hundreds of years, American corporations have innovated.

1:01:57the computer, the internet, all these things that we conceived of and brilliant innovators in the US often because of our great public education system and a lot of the shared values of our culture. Having public markets allows for...

1:02:16every day person to, you know, now it's more like through mutual funds and index funds or if you want to take a flyer on a company, but like benefit from the aggregate. That comes out of the American corporation. And like it really freezes those people out. And it's really, I mean, if you want to like really carry it forward, like sort of contributes to wealth polarization. Yeah, I think it absolutely does. Like I think they're, you know, there are two elements of As we are seeing in this election cycle play out so viscerally like income inequality and wealth inequality in America is more polarized than it's ever been. And here's the crazy thing we're sitting here on Monday night. Our listeners will know the outcome of this election where we do not. Yeah, we're literally the night before the election here, which is also crazy.

1:03:07All that riding outside that you hear all the sirens and stuff is because the Seahawks Monday night football game here in Pioneer Square, not because of the election night before the election. Seattle has its priorities either straight or completely wrong depending on how you view things. But yeah, part of that is that these entrepreneurs are creating these tech companies and they're getting massively wealthy, you know, Mark Zuckerberg and Travis and Airbnb guys and whatever. But it's equally on the investor side too, like the people that are investing in these companies, are so much more institutions now and for so much of the wealth creation period of these companies than they ever were so much more yeah when you restrict the access to invest to people that already have the information and means to do so and large enough you know amounts of money to deploy it's it's like it's a rich get richer scenario and

1:04:02That's pretty crazy and actually to kind of continue this like thinking about tech trends or really like investment trends With big institutions coming down market and investing directly rather than deploying that capital into private equity in late-stage venture It kind of puts the squeeze on those industries. So yeah, absolutely there with there's a few things sort of contributing to this trend There's this notion that we've been talking about the companies want to go public later but they are investment vehicles where large amounts of money can be deployed. So large amounts of money will be deployed. So there's that thing going on. Exactly. Simultaneously, you have this other market force that's fueling that, which is over the sense of development of the internet that one thing has always been true and that is more information will be more available to more people than previously existed. And so now it's so much easier to get information

1:04:59Then it previously was that you institutional investors VCs and private equity firms would make the case to their limited partners and their investors saying look I have information access and connections to these startups or these late-stage companies that I will deploy this capital into and I have unique access to that whereas like That's becoming less and less true. There's much more visibility into what companies are performing well, and people can kind of go find them directly. Obviously, that's not entirely true. There's still a very human element to all of this, but in general, it's easier to find out.

1:05:43Who is running a company and if that company is doing well and reach out to them, if you have an attractive offer to invest than it ever has been before. I think about this every day in being a venture capitalist. At the early stage were somewhat insulated from this somewhat, but only somewhat. There's sort of three things that a venture capitalist does and I didn't make this up, but lots of people talk about this, but it's totally true. You find one, find companies.

1:06:12great companies to pick them, decide if you're going to invest or not, if you think the company has high potential or not. But then three, win the deal, if it's a competitive deal.

1:06:23And, you know, it used to be that, like, those three disciplines were, like, all really important. And now, like, at least the belief is that it's all about winning the deal. You know, it's like, oh, yeah, like, you can find companies easily and like, yeah, you can tell, like, what's going to be successful and what's not. I mean, like, there's some judgment there, but, you know, it's kind of a commodity, but, like, winning, like, that's it's all about winning now. If, well, if that's the case, and it's really all about, you know, just getting the best deal, then...

1:06:50It should be more entrepreneur friendly and like prices should go up and It should be much more commoditized to the point exactly what's happened exactly that were that investors Effectively just get the minimum acceptable return that any of them are willing to deal with yep at the late stage venture This is a hundred percent what has happened over the last few years in the market and it's changing slightly on the margins but But this has been a powerful force across all adventure and especially late stage venture in the past few years. All because of the Facebook IPO. Thanks, Mark and Gerald. I don't know for saying that exactly. All right, listeners. Now is a great time to thank our longtime friend of the show, ServiceNow. If you are running a large enterprise, AI agents are likely spread across every team and deploying them is no longer the hard part.

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1:09:08So if you're trying to turn AI ambition into real business outcomes and make it work safely, securely at scale, go check out servicenow.com slash acquired and tell them that Ben and David sent you. All right. So we're bringing home. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Do you want to talk about how we thought about what our criteria would be for grading IPOs? Yeah, absolutely.

1:09:32you know the way that we normally grade an acquisition is through the lens of was it a good way to deploy that capital for the acquirer so we kind of close our eyes and don't really care about was it a good thing for the acquirer because like they're getting a bunch of money it was a great thing their investors are cashing out almost every time that we analyze it it was good yep and we think a little bit about like that Financial returns to the acquirer, but we're not spreadsheet jackies here. We think strategically was this a good move for the acquirer? Yeah, and we think about did that acquisition both provide that financial return but sort of in a longer lead time scenario, was it...

1:10:19something that made that a better, more lasting, more enduring, more valuable for longer, more valuable for longer company. And so the way that we decided that we're going to grade IPOs is through that same endurance lens. We want to assign this a grade based on the...

1:10:39Rubric of did it make this company a more lasting and enduring institution have it a bigger competitive mode make it a stronger more viable long lasting company yeah the the way We were talking about it before the show and and I want to think about it is like was the IPO a springboard for the company or or a diving board a lot of people thought the Facebook IPO was gonna be a diving board. Yeah Yeah. And so what that allows us to do is sort of zoom out from that terrible plunge, you know, in the first week plus the ensuing months. Really the whole year. Yeah. For the first year, I mean, the stock was below the IPO, below the IPO price. Right. And it allows us to look at the company as it exists today and look at that moment of IPO and say, was that the right move for the company or not. So with that rubric in mind,

1:11:36What's your grade on this? I am going to call this an A-. A lot of that is based on how bullish I am on Facebook today. How great their strategy has been since the IPO. Correcting for a lot of those blunders. The minus is because I am not convinced that All of the tumultuous times that they went through contributed to the success that they are today. I think that they could have gotten here. They definitely needed IPO. I think that was a no doubt about it. They needed to do that situation. But I think that they could have gotten to this point of hyper growth and kind of saturating the addressable human race with internet.

1:12:34Crocs that they're at today. I think they could have done that without such a bungled year. No doubt it was a bungled year. I'm not so sure. I am going to give this as probably unsurprisingly giving my enthusiasm during the history and facts. I'm going to give this an A+. Because I think they wouldn't have.

1:12:58And I think had they not gone through that year and had this massive, you know, 20,000 megawatt spotlight showing on them. They wouldn't have moved so fast to plug the mobile hole and wasn't just a hole like it was a chest wound. And and built like we said, not just the product, but the whole business advertising model and invented native advertising practically within six months. I think they, I agree with you. I think they could have done it eventually, but had they not moved so fast because of this, would they have lost? And the other thing that's in my mind here, clearly, May was the pivotal moment for the Facebook IPO when things really started to go south and These probably these cracks started getting exposed, but I got to imagine that the whole process was really in Mark and Cheryl's minds Starting to expose some of this stuff and What if they had not bought Instagram in April and

1:14:11and if they had not bought Instagram, and not moved so quickly to plug these holes, would there be a future where an alternate present today, where Instagram had remained an independent company, had become the Facebook of mobile, had figured out native advertising, and completely eating Facebook's lunch? I mean, because if you look at Facebook's revenue over the last couple of years, essentially the desktop Facebook is completely flat to down over the last four years. What was their whole business? This meteoric rise that made them the most hyped IPO ever, the largest technology IPO ever, that business is essentially dead. And like you said, 84% of their advertising now is mobile. What if that were, you know, half a third, a quarter, a fifth or a tenth of what it is today, an Instagram where the gorilla and mobile advertising?

1:15:09Yeah, I mean, there's a whole lot of things they would need to go right there, right? A whole lot of things for sure. It's that they would need, you know, to, to have a Cheryl Sandberg, right? Who's going to build this like operational advertising sales business, right? You would need, um, well, it's actually really interesting looking at, uh, so Twitter didn't have this crux. Yep. Right? Like, Twitter and Twitter was always, you know, if not mobile native, like it was built for mobile text messaging, right? Yeah. Yeah. And and you look at their transition to the the smartphone world and I mean, Twitter is still like still doesn't have a great ad unit. Yeah. And there's a lot of problems going on there and we're kind of seeing it all fall apart in front of our eyes, but like a large part of it is like it's just never.

1:16:04The Facebook ads are way more compelling, particularly on mobile. And like, if Facebook, you raised this interesting point, like if Facebook didn't feel this existential crisis, could they wind up in a Twitter-like situation, at least with their, maybe not with engagement, but with monetization? Yeah. Or even, you know, maybe not Instagram, but I'll throw it out there. You know, it was February 2012, when Facebook filed its S1.

1:16:30One year later, February 2013, Snapchat's founded. One of the greatest things that I love the most about our industry is it is so hyper competitive. I think this is just such a great case study of why you can't rest on your heels even when you are the largest tech IPO in history, because the next generation is coming right after you. Speaking of Twitter, Follow-ups, Twitter, lots going on on Twitter these days. But they're shutting down Vine, potentially selling Vine. Yeah, no surprise there. I mean, it's shocking to me that they haven't, and I think these will come, but they had like 9% layoffs.

1:17:17Like, it seems like there's a lot more of that to come. They got a streamline their products. Like, it's kind of shocking to me that they didn't do Periscope 2 and 1 fell swoop. I think the reason that's probably living on is because Facebook Live is proving so with a future of Facebook that Twitter is really afraid to exit that race when Facebook is making such a big bet on it. Yeah. Wait, total aside, by the way, related to Facebook.

1:17:45doesn't get it gets a lot of press but not in this context like Facebook is kind of trying to do this again. Everything we're just talking about it's reinventing itself around video. I think yeah, I think there's an existential thing where they totally and VR right like they totally fear like missing the the next boat since they almost missed the mobile boat so like bioculous and be way ahead of the curve. I snapchat yep, and you know snapchat is mobile and I just made that analogy like oh good snapchat killed Facebook and mobile but like snapchats also video right yeah Yeah, so for me you know tough to do you never want to kill products that people love but like I Want I'm rooting for Twitter to survive at all here And so I think they need a lot more belt tightening to get there because it's not to me they're in this tip very difficult situation where

1:18:34All the investors are super excited that they might sell so that sort of pushes the price up and then that price tag ends up being too expensive. So they're in this like we were catch 22 or they were unsuccessful in finding a buyer and now they have to like go figure it out. And they've already gone public right we need to add a third category to the show which is like what happens if you've already gone public you have no buyer.

1:19:00Like what then? Plan C. Yeah, it's an invaluable product to the world and it like I really want it to endure and it's actually a pretty good business like they sell a lot of ads and their ad there there are reasons why people use Twitter ads and can't necessarily satisfy that on any other platform. It's a good business. It's not a Facebook size business and they really need to reduce their cost to get it to a place where it can actually live on sustainably. Yep. I agree.

1:19:29Quick follow up on Skype, our last episode. We speculated on the show that Microsoft might have used foreign cash to buy Skype, which was a non-US company, and it turns out that is indeed the case, was indeed the case. We were pointed in this direction by Nick Sieglin, dear friend of Ben and the show.

1:19:53helped us a lot in the early days with feedback on the pilot. Thanks, Nick. And he pointed us to an old blog post that he wrote after the acquisition about talking with a friend about this. And yes, it turns out Microsoft did use cache that was holding overseas to buy Skype. And so it got a massive, it was able to essentially repatriate that cache, tax-free, then got a massive tax benefit for it.

1:20:20Definitely plays into how you should think about the Skype acquisition Yeah, and it's if I recall not Not only did they avoid you know paying the you know approximately 33% to repatriate that capital, but then there's that second advantage, too Yes, there is that second advantage and That's what is apparently referred to as quote, the deadly D that they can repatriate apparently up to another eight and a half billion of cash tax-free, which at a 30% tax rate is worth two and a half billion to them. So in theory, perhaps Microsoft is getting about $5 billion in tax credits out of value, out of the Skype deal. Pretty wild. And that's eye opening for me.

1:21:08If a US-based company uses overseas capital to make a purchase overseas, they can repatriate that same amount of capital back in exchange for deploying that capital in an acquisition. It's really interesting to start thinking about other companies that have huge amounts of cash overseas, Apple, Microsoft, and actually most big tech companies in this point. Yeah, all of them. And what they could possibly do.

1:21:37Interesting. Yeah, any corporate tax lawyers out there who know anymore about this. We'd love to hear from you. We'd love to hear from you. Let us know. All right. Carb out. Carb out. So I was chatting with some of the listeners in Slack. If you'd like to join the Slack, go to acquired.fm and you can sign up there.

1:21:59We were talking about the internet history podcast. Oh, so good. This is an awesome awesome awesome podcast where I believe it's Brian McCullough Brian McCC on Twitter It's like a hundred episodes or more. Yeah, super long. This is so good if you like acquired you will love the internet history podcast particularly the story part. Yeah, the I started listening to the the show like a year ago and it's like it's sort of like long form reading but just having it sort of read to you and he starts out with the the Netscape the story of the Netscape IPO dating all the way back to you know the founding of the mosaic project in Mark Andreessen and really like all the incredible drama in there but the the episode that I just listened to that I loved that had all sorts of interesting nuggets

1:22:50about the founding of Amazon with Amazon's technical co-founder and employee number one shell-capping. And it's so interesting to get the engineers perspective on the founding of Amazon because in, you know, the ensuing years, you kind of get the version of it that's in the everything store and you get Jeff talking about it on stage, and it's really this like...

1:23:14not quite revisionist history, not quite sensationalized, but definitely through the eyes and through the lens of what Amazon is today. And Shell left Amazon a few years after they founded it. And he almost feels like his viewpoint is frozen in time. And you really get to hear not only the perspective of someone who remembers just that piece of Amazon history extremely vividly, but he's also like, one of those just super endearing old school engineers. And the way that he talks about, you know, oh, well, you know, we were using an Oracle database that had never seen this many transactions before. So we crashed that and I was an Oracle guy. So we were just kind of making it work. And then like it's awesome to hear about all these really early stage Amazon stories about when they were kind of patching it all together in the early, really days of the web. So whether you're an engineer or not,

1:24:11I think anybody listening to this show will love that episode. Yeah, totally. And like we said, let us know too, if you like the IPO edition to the show, if you guys do, and we go forward with it, we're definitely going to have to do Amazon at some point. Absolutely. No shortage of drama in that IPO either. No. But okay, my carve out for the week, I thought, would be appropriate given that we covered Facebook today is a relatively new book by Paragkana called Connectography, mapping the future of global civilization that I read. This is a really good book. And basically, it's like a geopolitical piece, which usually is not what I'm into, but it hadn't recommended to me. And it's great. And basically, the thesis of the book is that

1:25:07What the axes of power in the world like geopolitically are not nation-states and borders and geography and land or even populations that much anymore. It's connectiveness, connectivity, and that the more connected a nation state is, whether it's physically with like supply chains or like, you know, supply chains for industry or oil pipelines or water or electricity, or the more connected they are to ideas and to trade, also relevant, very relevant to the election that is happening tomorrow as we record this happen in the past for all of you and happen in the past for all of you. Anyway, the argument is that the more connected a nation state is the more powerful it will be and that really nobody gets this better right now than China. And if you look at a lot of China's foreign

1:26:06policy, the Silk Road and the essentially massive trading block that they're forming in Asia. It's all kind of based on this and it's delivering, you know, creating massive power and influence for them. Anyway, great book, totally related to Facebook connecting the world. Yeah. All right, listeners. Now is a great time to talk about one of our favorite companies, Statsig.

1:26:34Yes, there is a reason why the best product teams rely on Statsig, whether they are iterating on their core product features or shipping AI-powered experiences at scale. Yeah, in the crazy speed of today's AI world, shipping fast is just table stakes now. It's basically trivial to build and deploy your app constantly.

1:26:55The real advantage is how quickly you learn what changes actually created value for customers. And how fast you can use that signal to guide what you shipped next. This is where Statsig comes in. It brings experimentation, feature flags, and product analytics into one unified system so teams can ship safely, test rigorously, and directly link what they changed to how users actually behaved. So if you want to make learning your competitive advantage, whether you're building new AI experiences or just evolving your existing core product, go to statsig.com slash acquired to get started. All right, well, that's it for today. If you aren't subscribed and you want to hear more, you can subscribe from your favorite podcast client. If you feel so inclined, we'd love a review on iTunes, maybe a tweet, share on Facebook. It's how we grow the show and it's how we make it even better. So thank you so much and have a great day.