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The Daily - The Iranians Who Want More War

Published Jul 28, 2026 · Duration 29:13 · Language en · 5 highlights

Summary

这期《The Daily》聚焦美伊在13天空袭后短暂停火期间,伊朗内部围绕是继续战斗还是寻求和平所暴露出的深刻分裂。记者阿卜迪在被政府严密监控的行程中,观察了被美以炸死的前最高领袖阿里·哈梅内伊的葬礼,发现数百万民众在悲痛中迅速转为愤怒,高呼“复仇”,反对任何谈判,甚至围攻参与外交的伊朗总统和外长。当葬礼接近尾声时,伊朗在霍尔木兹海峡袭击了三艘船只,被视为强硬派“流氓”分子破坏和平谅解备忘录的举动。分析者法尔纳兹指出,真正新颖的是保守派阵营内部的撕裂:以贾利利为首、约占人口10%到20%的极端强硬派主张永不与美国接触、消灭以色列,而以议长加利巴夫为代表的务实派则希望把战争筹码转化为外交、解除制裁、重建经济。新任最高领袖穆杰塔巴因面部烧伤、声带受损而藏匿失声,权威缺失造成的权力真空让分裂得以发酵,双方都争相声称获得他的支持。约占70%到80%的沉默大多数伊朗人既不想打仗也不认同政权,在400%的通胀和轰炸下饱受夹缝之苦,甚至发起请愿要把主战的强硬派送到南部前线体验后果。节目最后指出,美以原以为除掉老哈梅内伊就能瓦解革命狂热并带来政权更迭,但结果恰恰相反——伊朗更加军事化、强硬派更加根深蒂固,而缺乏绝对权威的新领袖难以掌控局面。

Highlights

  1. And she said something that I will not forget. Trump cannot scare us with death. In other words, we're willing to die in order to seek this revenge.

    她说了一句我永远不会忘记的话:特朗普无法用死亡吓倒我们。换句话说,为了复仇,我们甘愿赴死。

    Chilling, memorable quote that captures the depth of hardline defiance
  2. The attack on the ship came as a surprise to the president, to the foreign minister. And it was sort of seen as hardliners who have been advocating to drag Iran back to the war and derail the talks, you know, taking this kind of an action.

    袭击船只一事让总统和外长都措手不及。这被视为那些一直鼓吹把伊朗重新拖入战争、破坏谈判的强硬派采取的行动。

    Surprising claim that rogue hardliners may have launched an attack without central command
  3. Nobody has heard his voice because sources say that his face was burned in the airstrikes on their compound and his vocal cords were damaged. And I think this absence of Moshtab-e-Khamenei has created a real void.

    没有人听过他的声音,因为消息人士称,空袭他们的院落时他的面部被烧伤、声带也受了损。我认为穆杰塔巴·哈梅内伊的缺席造成了一个真正的权力真空。

    Striking, humanizing detail explaining the leadership vacuum at the center of the crisis
  4. There was this online petition where Iranians were digitally signing on saying let's send all the hardliners, the lawmakers and the politicians who are calling for constant war to the south of Iran where they would be under nightly bombardments and they would see the consequences ...

    有一份网上请愿书,伊朗人纷纷在线签名,说要把所有鼓吹持续战争的强硬派、议员和政客送到伊朗南部去,让他们在夜夜轰炸中亲身体会自己所鼓吹的后果。

    Vivid grassroots protest revealing the silent majority's anger at the hardliners
  5. The Islamic Republic was created on this idea of fighting America, fighting Israel, of anti-Western ideals, and for the Supreme Leader to completely do away with that... it would basically be the end of the Islamic Republic as we've known it.

    伊斯兰共和国的建立就是基于对抗美国、对抗以色列以及反西方理念,如果最高领袖彻底抛弃这些……那基本上就意味着我们所熟知的伊斯兰共和国的终结。

    Powerful insight framing why peace is existentially threatening to the regime
Full transcript

From The New York Times, I'm Michael Babaro. This is The Daily. After 13 consecutive days of airstrikes, the United States and Iran have temporarily paused their fighting. But the conflict could resume at any moment. And inside Iran, a small but powerful faction is determined to make sure that it does. Today, Abdi Latif Tahir and Farnaz Fasih explain the profound divisions within Iran about whether to keep fighting or to try to make peace. It's Tuesday, July 28th. This was a very choreographed event from the beginning. A few weeks ago, the Iranian government allowed my colleague Abdi Latif to hear into the country.

Immediately we landed in Tehran. We got through immigration and essentially you're met there by your mind. It was not long after the U.S. and Iran had signed a tentative peace deal. And Abdi became the first Times reporter to get into Iran in months. We had two governments appointed translator and a guide who pretty much went everywhere with us.

could not leave the hotel essentially without planning with them where we wanted to go, what we wanted to see. And he was there for a very specific purpose, to observe the multi-day funeral service for Iran's former Ayatollah, Ali Homanayi, who had been killed by the US and Israel in the early days of the Iran War. And Amdi says his every movement at the funeral services was heavily monitored.

they listened in on pretty much all the interviews. And one of the miners was also very open with us. And essentially, he told me that, yes, at the end of every day, he basically was expected to send a report about our activities where we went, what we did during that day. Abdi, why do you think that Iran let you into the country? What do you think that they wanted you to see?

I think they definitely wanted us to see the way people had come out to mourn Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader. So we were very much in the middle of the capital, the center of Tehran. For days on end, you couldn't escape the soundscape that was coming from outside, the chanting, the mourning, the wailing.

You kind of felt like you had been signed up for this very much stage-managed choreographed scene. So you had the first day where the dignitaries from all across the world came to pay their respects. And then... There was a procession held at the Zadi Square in which the body of Haminei and his relatives were now being viewed by the public. And there were millions who...

showed up that day throughout the day and essentially came to see the bodies despite the heat, despite the haze, despite everything else. People came from all over the country. They were young. They were old. They were on wheelchairs. They were on crutches. The journalists were definitely being allowed to go on bridges and on top of the buildings so that we could see the sea of people who are coming through. So you definitely got a sense that even the access to these buildings were choreographed in such a way that it was like you had to see, you had to experience how everybody has come from all over the country to mourn their leader. And is grief the prevailing feeling that you get from this crowd? What exactly are you hearing from them? You know, many people, you know, are in tears. They were very sad.

But even when they were crying, you know, their expressions would very quickly harden into anger and defiance. And I remember talking to this woman. Sultan Ali and I watched her for a while before I approached her because she was carrying this flag that talked about revenge and but she was like really in tears and at some point when she calmed down like you know I approached her and very quickly this idea of negotiations came up and she was very opposed to that.

And I was like, well, it seems like the guns have silenced now. And essentially, that has even allowed for this massive funeral to happen. And she said, yes, that's OK. But we do not want these talks. We do not want these negotiations. We want revenge for our slain leader. And we want revenge for everyone else who was killed and all the institutions that were impacted. And she said something that I will not forget.

Trump cannot scare us with death. Trump cannot scare us with death. In other words, we're willing to die in order to seek this revenge. People did not want diplomacy. They did not want the talks. They were not for compromising. There was definitely a lot of calls for the killing of Trump. There was definitely a lot of death to America, death to Israel. And I think if there's one word that really defined these public morning ceremonies, it's the word revenge, which is in Taqam.

We saw that written in English, in Arabic, in Farsi. It was on banners. It was on posters. It was on flags. Like, you know, people were wearing shirts that basically said that. And pretty much like the dozens and dozens of people that I interviewed throughout my time in Iran at these massive ceremonies and processions, that is the message everybody wanted to leave with me, that we will not compromise and we want revenge for our slain leader.

The timing of what you're seeing here seems extremely important because these crowds demanding revenge demanding that Trump be killed They know full well that their government has just signed a peace agreement this memorandum of understanding with the United States and with President Trump and What they're calling for is the exact opposite of that. So how do they square that?

So during these public morning ceremonies, the public very much showed how they felt about some of these political leaders who had gone and had taken part in the negotiations with the United States. So you had, for instance, Iran's president and Iran's foreign minister then showing up to these events and they were confronted and targeted by crowds who basically were very angry at the fact that they had taken part in these diplomatic talks.

President Pezish Kian, you know, was nearly knocked to the ground by these crowds who were shouting death to the compromise and death to the appeaser and his security forces essentially rushed to evacuate him. You had a foreign minister, Arachi, who, you know, some of the people in the crowd started throwing stones at him. They were very hostile. They were chanting, you know, basically calling him a traitor.

and essentially he also had to flee the scene where he was. And it was so indicative of the ways in which revenge and avenging the Supreme Leader had become so central to how people, at least the people who showed up for these ceremonies and how they felt about that. Right. Because in this highly choreographed scene that the government is putting on and wants you to see, the mourners are actually turning on the government's leaders. That's how deep these divisions are. Exactly. And you have, like, all these hardliners, right, who are very much opposed to these negotiations and diplomacy with the United States. And the only thing that they talk about and they think about and they repeat consistently is that we want, in Taqam, in Taqam, revenge, revenge. It was amid these intense calls for revenge.

as the Ayatollah's funeral drew to a close, that the divisions Abdi saw on the streets played out on an even bigger scale. In a surprise move, Iran struck three ships in the Strait of Hormuz. A U.S. official telling me that this was a gross violation of the memorandum of understanding by Iran. And that delicate peace agreement with the United States began to crumble. After the break, my colleague Farnaz Fasih on the war playing out inside of Iran's government. We'll be right back. Farnaz, Abdi just described this profound divide that was on display during the Ayatollah's funeral between hardline religious supporters of the regime and the government officials who negotiated a peace deal with the U.S. And when Iran attacked U.S. ships, the first question I think quite logically was who was responsible for that decision?

and had these hardliners persuaded the government to restart this war? Well, that's a really good question. I think we haven't reached a definitive answer on exactly who made the decision or how what has been seen as a provocative act to attack these ships really came about. Right after this, the United States said in briefings to our colleagues that the Iranian mediators that they'd been in touch with told the United States that it wasn't us, that these were like rogue hard line elements within the revolutionary guards that had decided to attack the ships.

I think this was one of the very few and only attacks that they didn't officially claim an issuer statement saying, we did this. When I reached out to sources, I heard the same thing from a source that the attack on the ship came as a surprise to the president, to the foreign minister. And it was sort of seen as hardliners who have been advocating to drag Iran back to the war and derail the talks, you know, taking this kind of an action.

say that that's quite an extraordinary prospect that hardliners were so intent on ending this peace process and undermining the memorandum of understanding that had been reached by the official Iranian government that they would launch an attack against the United States to do that. Exactly. It's extraordinary because if this is true, if the hardliners would on their own without central command decide to take such a consequential step with massive consequences for Iran, for the 90 million people there, for the region. What does that say about sort of the disarray within the Iranian rank and file? Like, who made that decision? This speaks to the massive divide in the system at this very pivotal critical time in the country's political history.

it seems like Iran's government and leadership is at war with itself. Well, Farnaz, that's really what we want to talk to you about as such an expert on the internal workings of Iran. This emerging war inside Iran over the war itself and who is winning at the moment and what it means for the future of the conflict. So help us understand the various factions that are currently at war with each other? Well, I'll start by saying that political differences and infighting within Iran's political circles is not new. They've always sort of existed in Iran's modern politics, the Islamic Republic's rule.

But what's really new here is that it's happening within the conservative camp, right? You've traditionally had the conservatives that sort of believe in a more ideological view of governing and the reformers who wanted to keep the Islamic Republic rule but reform and change. But that's not what's happening now.

within the conservative group that runs the country right now, that holds power, which includes the powerful revolutionary guards generals, there is major differences and fractures. Okay, well, help us understand the divisions within this conservative world of Iran's leadership. So on one side, you have the ultra hardliners, led by a politician named Saeed Jalili.

They have a worldview that says Iran must never engage with the United States. Israel must be destroyed. this ideological, Islamist, extremist view that was sort of the beginning of this revolution is very much how they plan to rule. Don't talk to the United States. Continue fighting. And this faction is a minority but still has constituents. They're the people that come out every time the government wants to rally its supporters onto the streets.

And at the funeral of the late senior Ayatollah Khamenei, these are the people who were bussed from all over the country, came out in millions, were waving red flags of revenge. So this is the core constituent of the system. And thus they can't really be ignored and set aside, right? Because they're always there no matter what. They always show up for the regime, right? So this is the religious base and foundation for this theocracy. Right, exactly. They're the foundation for the theocracy. If I were to say what their numbers are in Iran's 90 million, I would say somewhere between 10 to 20 percent, judging from the numbers of the polls where they always show up and the candidates that they pick. So they are a minority, but they're a very vocal and loyal minority.

And who's on the other side of this divide? So on the other side of the divide is really the senior leadership of the government and many powerful generals of the revolutionary guards. This coalition represents the pragmatics within the system. General Muammar Bar-Ghalibov, the Speaker of Parliament and the person leading negotiations with the United States has down repeated interviews on state television and has said in statements that, look, we have to take whatever leverage we've gained in the war and turn it into diplomacy. That diplomacy is not a sign of defeat or surrender, but we can actually make some gains by negotiating with the United States. We can't fight endlessly. We have to open up Iran economically. We have to get rid of the sanctions. So this group is of the view that these

hard-line policies of let's fight until our last breath, let's drag the country into chaos and instability is not really the direction they want to take the country. Right. So these would seem to be the peace seekers, the people who struck a deal with the US because they want to preserve what's left of their country and rebuild it rather than fight endlessly at the risk of having nothing left in Iran at the end of this conflict. Does this group include Iran's current Supreme Leader, the son of the lay Ayatollah who was killed by Israel and the US. That would seem to be a key question. It's a key question because both sides are trying to claim Moshtab al-Khamenei, the new Supreme Leader. He's been absent from view because he's in hiding, fearing assassination.

Right, we've talked about this. And nobody has heard his voice because sources say that his face was burned and the airstrikes on their compound and his vocal cords were damaged. And I think this absence of Moshtab-e-Khamenei has created a real void.

And in that void where the father used to have a yes or no vote, he had authority to have sort of a final say over matters. The son doesn't have that authority. He doesn't have that religious clout. He doesn't have that political clout. So this has created a kind of space where these divisions can fester.

You're saying without a supreme leader who can shut down these kinds of divisions or paper over them and call the shots, then even though, for example, the hardliners are a minority, they can exert a fair amount of influence. They can perhaps, I know we're not sure, even maybe restart the war because there isn't a strong enough person to ensure that there's really unity in the leadership.

Right, exactly. There's no unity in the leadership. You know, I think that Mushaba has, to the extent that he's issued written statements, has said, put your differences aside, that these divisions are being closely watched by Iran's enemies, and it suggests that we're weak.

But nobody's really listening to him. I mean, that's the remarkable thing. Like you have like the hardliner supporters and rallies shout the only way we will believe that Moshe Abbas supports this deal or supports the policies if we hear from him directly or we see him. And lawmakers that are aligned with the hardliners have even publicly accused the government of staging a coup to bypass the supreme leader. So the hardliners, if I'm hearing this correctly, are suggesting that the pragmatists making peace with the US may be doing that without the authorization of the Supreme Leader. They're questioning the legitimacy of the peace process.

Exactly. And in its own defense, the pragmatists have all come out and said, look, everything we're doing is with Mojtapa's approval. We would not make any critical decisions, including negotiations or concessions to the United States without the Supreme Leader's involvement. And we have his backing. So this is both sides trying to claim support of Mojtapa and Mojtapa being on their team without him really coming out clearly and saying which side he's clearly endorsing. So far, you're really describing a conflict within Iran's government. This small group of hardliners who are undoing the work of a much larger group of pragmatists, based on previous conversations you and I have had on this show, I feel safe in assuming that the majority of Iranians, you've often put it at 70 to 80 percent of

the country's population that just want peace and just want to go about their lives and are not so attached to any one vision of an ideology in Iran, that they don't like the fact that this peace has been disrupted by the hardliners. So what are they saying and do they have any influence over any of this? I think that there is a very large, silent majority of Iranians who don't want the war but also don't necessarily like the Islamic Republic regime or support it, they feel like their lives and livelihoods are being upended by these radical decisions that the hardliners are making with very direct consequences on their lives, on their safety, on their future. And they are very angry at the hardliners. And they are saying that we didn't want the war. We don't want our infrastructure to be ruined. We don't, you know, the economy is

at a near collapse. There's 400% inflation on basic groceries. So Iranians are under tremendous amount of pressure and uncertainty. And we hear this all the time that the majority of Iranians feel like they are caught in the crossfires of the United States, Israel, and the regime and their being squeezed and nobody's really thinking about their well-being and what they really want.

There was this online petition that was going on that really captured this sense where Iranians were digitally signing on to this petition saying let's send all the hardliners, the lawmakers and the politicians who are calling for constant war to the south of Iran where they would be under nightly bombardments and they would see the consequences of what they're advocating for because they're sitting in the safety of their bunkers and they're advocating for war against the country, its infrastructure and its people. Well, Farnaz, let's say that the supreme leader were to decide in the coming days or weeks that he's fed up with this infighting, that he recognizes that a minority within a minority, the hardliners within the conservative leadership are dragging the country back into war and he's tired of it and he were to make a public appearance.

use his own voice, let's say that's suddenly possible, which could in theory satisfy these hardliners who really want to hear from him directly. And he says, stop it, enter the peace process, honor the peace process, let's rebuild Iran, let's end this phase of this conflict. Could he do that? Would that message carry enough weight to silence these hardliners? It's a very good question, but it's one that remains unclear.

partly because Moshe Habachamene was a man in the shadows, not a whole lot is known about him or his style of leadership. So it's really hard to gauge exactly how he will rule when he surfaces and how much clout he will have. It's also a very risky prospect for him, Michael, because to do that...

he would essentially have to declare that he fully trusts the United States and President Trump and that despite the many times that the U.S. has, in Iran's view, negated its obligations both under the first nuclear deal exiting from that and then attacking Iran in the midst of negotiations several times, that he's sort of saying that I put my full trust in this deal with the United States. That's a very difficult thing, I think, for Iran's Supreme Leader to do. So I think more realistically, even when he emerges, he's going to try to navigate everybody and try to appeal to all sides just to allow himself a little bit of leverage everywhere and enough distance to claim it if it works and disown it if it falls apart. So the reason the Supreme Leader is unlikely to ever

take sides as firmly as I just outlined is because it would risk his legitimacy with the hardliners in a way that he cannot tolerate. Right, exactly. I mean, you have to remember that the Islamic Republic was created on this idea of fighting America, fighting Israel, of anti-Western ideals, and for the Supreme Leader to completely do away with that, and for the hardliners to set aside that animosity and that hostility, it would basically be the end of the Islamic Republic as we've known it. And if that's gone, then what is left of the Islamic Republic? It's going to be a new Iran, a new system. And I think that's why they're fighting so hard because they know if the pragmatists win, if really a peace deal, lasting peace deal with the United States works.

that they're going to basically be even more marginalized. And what's now become very clear is that when the United States and Israel started this war, they thought that taking out the Ayatollah would mean taking out this revolutionary fervor and toppling it. And instead, it's still very much alive and still too potent a force for even the Ayatollah's son and successor to confront. That's exactly right. I mean, you've heard President Trump say repeatedly that the wars brought regime change in Iran, but there's been no regime change. And in fact, what we're seeing is that the country has become more militarized, that the hardliners are becoming more entrenched, and that Iran's now being led by a supreme leader that doesn't have the kind of absolute

power and cloud to guide things one way or the other. Well, for now, thank you very much. Appreciate it. Thank you for having me, Michael. In an interview with NBC News, the US ambassador to the United Nations, Mike Walts, acknowledged that divisions inside Iran's government have made it increasingly difficult for the Trump administration to negotiate a peace deal. What we are constantly seeing is on the Iranian regime side, They are divided. There is internal fighting. Some are seeking the guidance of the Supreme Leader. Others want to move into a different direction. And that makes it hugely challenging from a diplomatic standpoint, but to get to some reasonable resolution here. I would take the president very seriously if I was the awardee. We'll be right back. Here's what else you need to know today. In Spain and France, officials are warning that extreme heat in the coming days

could intensify what they're already calling the worst wildfire season in modern history. In southwestern France, the wildfires have burned through nearly 300,000 acres and displaced at least 200,000 people, one of the largest peacetime evacuations in France's history. Meanwhile, in Spain, The country's prime minister said that the fires there have burned through hundreds of thousands of acres, and he said that the climate emergency that scientists have been warning about for years had arrived. The new heatwave is expected to hit both Spain and France starting on Wednesday. Today's episode was produced by Jack De Sidoro, Rochelle Banja, and Shannon Lin. It was edited by Devin Taylor and Rob Zivko.

and contains music by Marion Lazano and Sophia Landman. Our theme music is by Wonderly. This episode was engineered by Chris Wood. Special thanks to Michael Adams, Mikhail Golustov, and Perrin Beiruz. That's it for the Daily. I'm Michael Boboro. See you tomorrow.

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